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ABSTRACT 
Global warming has increased the Arctic’s geopolitical significance, especially for 
Russia, which has taken steps to expand its military and economic influence there. This 
thesis sought to develop a strategy that the United States and its allies can use to 
minimize Russian influence in the Arctic. The research considered the Arctic’s economic 
importance to Russia, security matters associated with the region, and Russia's national 
pride regarding the Arctic. It also looked at the implications of bringing the Arctic to 
NATO’s attention and analyzed the capabilities of the United States and its allies to deter 
Russia and maintain the status quo in the region. This study determined that Russia is 
using the Arctic to pursue an economic resurrection and is maintaining an ambiguous 
political environment in which it might use the threat of military incursion to accomplish 
its foreign policy objectives. Moreover, there is little each Arctic country can do to 
predict or to deter Russia’s actions in the region. The Western states need to align in a 
collective response to prevent Russia from taking a leading role in the Arctic. Pulling the 
Arctic into NATO’s orbit might be a solution, but the implications and risks of doing this 
need to be considered carefully. 
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This project focuses on Russia’s increased military and economic interest in the 
Arctic region1 and the possibility that Russia might use the threat of military incursion or 
seek to take advantage of a possible crisis in the Arctic to accomplish its national policy 
objectives. The United States and its allies within the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) alliance should adopt a NATO Arctic Strategy to achieve a common 
understanding that addresses the region’s security challenges. 
Climate change has led to an unprecedented melting of ice in the Arctic, which has 
opened new opportunities, such as easier extraction of natural resources as well as safer 
shipping and navigation in the so-called “Northern Sea Route (NSR), also known as the 
Northeast Passage.”2 For that reason, and others, this study explicitly highlights, the 
importance of the Arctic is growing, especially for Russia.3 The thesis will examine what 
factors other than purely economic interest aroused Russia’s greater involvement in the 
Arctic, and what challenges the United States and its allies will face in deterring Russia’s 
attempt to restore its position as a global power. 
The Arctic has been a long-dismissed territory, to which the great powers have 
gradually switched their attention, as a new region, maybe the last one of the “balance-
shifters in the global equilibrium of power.”4 Both Russia and China have growing 
interests in the region and have increased their military capabilities on open ice waters. 
Russia’s interest is further influenced by its limited ability to expand in Europe and Asia. 
Moreover, the Ukraine crisis triggered by Russia’s hostile posture has damaged Western 
states’ willingness to cooperate with Moscow. The sanctions that were placed on Russia as 
                                                 
1 This region is also referred to as the “High North” 
2 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Northeast Passage,” June 19, 2013, https://www.britannica.com/topic/
Northeast-Passage. 
3 Kathrin Keil, “The Arctic: A New Region of Conflict? The Case of Oil and Gas,” Cooperation and 
Conflict 49, no. 2 (June 2014): 162–90, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836713482555. 
4 Marlène Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, Inc, 2014), xviii. 
2 
a result greatly reduced the cooperation on Arctic exploration.5 The other Arctic rim states 
such as Canada, Denmark, or Norway are not interested in the collective defense of the 
Arctic, their focus being purely on securing their current national territories.6 In this 
context, in this challenging region of the word, the United States should join together with 
its allies and take a leading role on expanding deterrence in the region of the Arctic. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research seeks to address the following: What is the strategy that the United 
States and its allies should enact to minimize Russian influence in the Arctic? The response 
requires two additional questions. 
First, what policies can be applied by the United States and its allies to extend such 
deterrence in the Arctic? Russia’s interests in the Arctic are straightforward. The thesis will 
consider Russia’s involvement in the Arctic, from three perspectives: economic concerns, 
security matters, and international acknowledgment tied with national pride. The project 
will examine each of these three components. Consequently, the policies that the United 
States and its allies should apply, need to be aligned with the actual regional relations 
between all Arctic states. 
Second, how should the NATO alliance engage in the Arctic? The Arctic is a 
controversial political space governed by policies enacted mainly from economic and 
ecological points of view. Institutions such as the Arctic Council (AC) and the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) work on issues related to environmental protection and 
sustainable development, but also engage in activities such as simplifying border crossings, 
emergency search and rescue, and protection of indigenous people.7 The Arctic military 
issues and territorial matters are excluded from such institutions, including the European 
                                                 
5 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and China in the Arctic: Cooperation, Competition, and Consequences,” 
Carnegie Moscow Center, Foreign and Security Policy, March 31, 2020. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/
81407?fbclid=IwAR3_Kv99Zrw7M880Zt3zoUc0WZaHE9X__vy8CShiso9i5kGvH27Fj2xBFw4. 
6 Siemon Wezeman, “Military Capabilities in the Arctic,” Sipri Background Paper, October 2016, 
https://www.sipri.org/publications/2016/sipri-background-papers/military-capabilities-arctic. 
7 Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North, xiv. 
3 
Union (EU). As a result, the only international institution capable of addressing the 
challenge of security in the Arctic remains NATO.8 However, placing the Arctic under 
NATO’s purview comes with certain challenges. How will the alliance consider 
outweighing the costs and the benefits of such action? Is NATO ready, and more 
importantly, what are its capabilities to deter Russia’s arouse in the Arctic?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Arctic region is emerging as a new focus of intensified struggle, not just 
between Russia and the other four rim Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Norway and the 
United States), but also for those that consider the Arctic an area of interest, such as China. 
The unique geopolitical and military features of the Arctic have attracted the interest of 
many nations. One of the unique geopolitical and military features of the Arctic is the 
critical strategic maritime transit route known as the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom 
(GIUK) Gap. Scholars such as Benjamin Rhode believe that the Gap strategic value has 
caught NATO’s attention, especially after Russia’s subversion of Ukraine in 2014.9 
Second, some of the  shortest trade distances between Asia, Europe, and the Americas are 
through the contested NSR, and Russia tightened its control by imposing limitations on 
foreign ships transiting through these newly ice-free waters.10 Other Arctic states have 
contested these limitations. Arctic’s unexplored natural resources, and the idea of Russia’s 
“resource nationalism,” will likely cause increased tensions in the region. Last but not least, 
the Arctic is part Arctism, one of the three Russia’s main geographical metanarratives, in 
which Russia is going farther north, and which together with Eurasianism (Russia’s 
territory is larger than any other countries in the world and forms and continent), and 
Cosmism (territorial expansion continues in the space), gives the country its uniqueness 
                                                 
8 Anna Wieslander, “It’s Time for NATO to Engage in the Arctic,” Defense One, September 16, 2019, 
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/09/its-time-nato-arctic/159887/. 
9 Benjamin Rhode, “The GIUK Gap’s Strategic Significance,” IISS 25, October 2019, 
https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2019/the-giuk-gaps-strategic-significance. 
10 The Maritime Executive, “Russia Tightens Control Over Northern Sea Route,” August 3, 2019, 
https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/russia-tightens-control-over-northern-sea-route. 
4 
among nations.11 According to Marlene Laruelle, the Arctic is an important component of 
Russian nationalist movement, being probably the last opportunity for the revival of 
Russia’s great-power status.12 
Laruelle argues that Russia has an increased political-military interest in expanding 
influence in the Arctic, as a pursuit of its state objectives. Its expansion there is a coherent 
and goal-oriented activity meant to challenge Western domination of an international order 
that Russia’s state leadership perceives as detrimental to its own interests and therefore, 
intrinsically vulnerable. 
During the peak of the Cold War, the Arctic was considered of strategic importance 
for both the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the general opinion about the 
region was perceived like being well-balanced, especially by the two superpowers, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union. The bipolar period of the Arctic was characterized by 
the strategies of those two countries, which were to preserve the stability of the region 
through their own political views (democracy by the United States and communism by the 
Soviet Union). Threats were seen only from the military perspective; therefore, the concept 
of security was narrowed. 
However, after the end of the Cold War, the Arctic region has declined considerably 
in strategic relevance for both the United States and the new Russia. However, by its nature, 
the Arctic is a region of growing geo-strategic cautious competition heightened by climate 
change. Climate change in the Arctic brings new threats not only to the United Stated 
national security, but also to the fragile status-quo of the region; therefore it is imperative 
for the second largest Arctic state—the United States—to adapt its maritime strategy and 
posture.13 Access to vast and new petroleum and gas reserves, mineral deposits, along with 
the perspective of new shorter and safer maritime trading routes, have increased the 
                                                 
11 Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North, 39. 
12 Laruelle, 39–40. 
13 Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic: An Assessment of Current 




security strategic importance of this region as a growth prospect energy. Although the 
United States has promoted an Arctic Strategy since 2009, it lacks needed capabilities to 
successfully respond to challenges in the Arctic region, and to ensure it can play a 
significant role in the Arctic global commons.14 The United States must address the 
shortcomings in both military capacity and policy thinking,  if it plans to support and 
enhance its stated national Arctic policy, and to maintain a stable geopolitical environment. 
For that, the United States needs to “foster close allegiances and play a leadership role in 
NATO.”15 
The NATO alliance can help defend the Arctic. Thule Air Base is a good example 
of cooperation in the Arctic, with its population of approximately 600, made up of America, 
Canadian, and Danish military members, as well as civilians from Greenland, Denmark, 
and the United States. Although it is extremely isolated, being found 700 km above the 
Arctic Circle, it is a good example of inter-alliance cooperation at the top of the world.16 
Without an official Arctic strategy, NATO is challenged to raise its attention to 
yield its vision in the area and to fulfill a more significant role, although there is a growing 
recognition within NATO that the Arctic dynamics may pose a threat to the security of the 
Alliance in the world.17 
C. METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESIS  
This thesis focuses on the increase of Russia’s military and economic interest in the 
Arctic region, and on the possibility that Russia might use the threat of foreign military 
incursion or might seek to take advantage of a possible crisis in the Arctic to accomplish 
its national policy objectives. To determine that, it is essential to weigh the strategic 
                                                 
14 Ronald O’Rourke et al., Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report 
No. R41153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R41153.pdf. 
15 Tyler Cross, “The NATO Alliance’s Role in Arctic Security,” The Maritime Executive, January 16, 
2020, https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/the-nato-alliance-s-role-in-arctic-security. 
16 Cross. 
17 Iona Allan Mackenzie, “Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Arctic States, China and NATO” 
(Riga, Latvia: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, December 2019). 
6 
purposes the Russian arctic forces could pose in the Arctic. Russia has shown that it has 
the capacity and the determination to take advantage of its military power to carry out its 
foreign policy goals. This has been visible as part of Russian grand strategy under Putin, 
as Keith Payne and John Foster noted, since Russia’s 2008 occupation of Georgia’s 
territories, augmented in 2014 with the occupation of Crimea, the war in eastern Ukraine 
and military support for the Syrian government.18 This argument leads to the question of 
what Russia would gain by lengthening its borders in the Arctic, and if it did so, what the 
implications would be for the Arctic states and for the region itself. 
Disastrous events in the Arctic may happen anytime, due to the fact that the 
emergency response policies and infrastructure such as search and rescue (SAR) 
capabilities is not sufficiently developed, due to the increase in commercial, tourist, and 
military traffic.19 Moreover, the research will highlight how essential the Arctic is in the 
Russian Federation Strategy, and what challenges are faced by the United States and the 
Arctic coastal states such as Canada, Denmark, and Norway.  
This research assesses the degree to which the strategy of the United States and its 
allies will succeed in minimizing Russian influence in the Arctic and deterring future 
Russian influence in the High North. Moreover, this effort analyzes why the Arctic is 
essential in Russian Federation Strategy, addressing the matter from two perspectives: 
economic and social development on the one hand, and sovereignty interests in the region 
on the other. In addition, this study investigates whether economic and social development 
is a subterfuge for future Russian military intervention in the region. 
To assess Russia’s behavior toward the Arctic, the study will examine Russia’s 
interests, and then its activities who are challenging the rules-based international orders 
who applies in the Arctic. Finally, the study will reflect the challenges that are faced by the 
United States and the Arctic coastal states such as Canada, Denmark, and Norway to deter 
and minimize Russian influence and avoid futile escalation of force into the Arctic region. 
                                                 
18 Keith B. Payne and John S. Foster, “Russian Strategy Expansion, Crisis and Conflict,” Comparative 
Strategy 36, no. 1 (January 2017): 1–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2017.1277121. 
19 Conley and Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic, 7. 
7 
First thesis will first examine why the Arctic matters for the Russian Federation. 
The concern for the Arctic is growing in the face of the changing climate and environment. 
While the fragile barrier of ice is melting, Russian claims in the Arctic region are 
increasing. Russia seeks control over an area, to include the North Pole that is increasingly 
available for oil drilling, new trade routes and more, as it is the nation with the longest 
Arctic coast of any state. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), all Arctic littoral states’ territorial waters extend to a maximum of 12 
nautical miles (22 km).20 However, every coastal state may establish an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles (370 km) from shore giving that state 
“special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy 
production from water and wind.”21 UNCLOS also “allows states to extend their limits 
beyond 200 miles if they can provide scientific evidence that the continental shelf beyond 
their coastline extends that far,” thus giving them rights to make any decisions on the 
extraction of natural resources.22 This is considered to be the legal basis for Russia’s claim 
to the Lomonosov ridge/subsoil resources under the North Pole, its dispute being on the 
last agenda of the discussions at the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS) still under revision by the organization.23 A positive response is not likely to be 
well perceived by the other littoral states, especially by Denmark and Canada, the two 
countries that already have overlapping claims with Russia. It is worth mentioning that 
although the United States, has not ratified UNCLOS, it has contested the Russian claims 
by submitting formal demands supported by scientific arguments.24   
                                                 
20 United Nations, “UNCLOS,” November 16, 1982, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/
convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm. 
21 United Nations, “UNCLOS.” 
22 United Nations, “UNCLOS.” 
23 Atle Staalesen, “Russia Is Winning Support for Its Claims on Arctic Shelf, Says Chief Negotiator,” 
The Independent Barents Observer, Arctic, November 28, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/
2019/11/russia-winning-support-its-claims-arctic-shelf-says-chief-negotiator. 
24 Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North, 100. 
8 
Therefore, disputes derive from the desired further development of each state’s 
EEZ, based on the previous geological expertise determining that this area constitutes a 
natural extension of the continental shelf of a given country.25 In 2008, the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the Arctic may contain 13 percent of the world’s 
undiscovered oil and up to 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas resources.26  A 
study by Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev emphasizes the Arctic Zone of the 
Russian Federation (AZRF) as being extremely important in the economy of Russia with 
interests to access and exploit its natural resources.27 For that, dominating the Arctic has 
become vital for Russia to boost its economy, and moreover, Putin’s regime sees in the 
Arctic policy a way of restoring Russia’s status as a global power, and at the same time 
gaining support from its domestic audience.28 This argument emphasizes the fact that the 
Arctic is a long-term strategic focus for Russia, on which Moscow relies to define its 
dynamic and powerful role on the international stage but also to rebuild its nation-branding 
and prestige on the international scene.29 
Next, this thesis will examine the international environment and how Russia may 
take advantage of it. Russia’s policies in the Arctic focus on security matters, economic 
issues and other outcomes accredited to them. Russia’s authority and behavior in the Arctic 
have always been in accordance with the rules of international law, especially with the 
provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS that ensure the legal rights of each of the five coastal 
                                                 
25 Mateusz Kubiak, “Russian Policy towards the Arctic,” Warsaw Institute, December 14, 2018, 
https://warsawinstitute.org/russian-policy-towards-arctic/. 
26 USGS, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the 
Arctic Circle,” Fact Sheet, 2008, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf. 
27 Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy,” in Russia: Strategy, Policy 
and Administration, ed. Irvin Studin (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1057/978-
1-137-56671-3_13. 
28 Ekaterina Piskunova, “Russia in the Arctic: What’s Lurking behind the Flag?,” International 
Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 65, no. 4 (December 2010): 851–64, https://doi.org/
10.1177/002070201006500415. 
29 Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North; Dmitri Trenin and Pavel Baev, 
“The Arctic: A View from Moscow,,” 44. 
9 
states of the Arctic.30 However, aggressive actions and illegitimate behavior existed, such 
as the incident from 2005 in which a Russian trawler named Elektron did not submit to 
arrest by the Norwegian Coast Guard and moreover broke away from its escort and headed 
for the Russian coast with two Norwegian officers on board, and a 2007 Russian polar 
expedition (with a Russian official from the State Duma on board) which ended with the 
planting of a one meter-high titanium Russian flag as a symbolic claim of the North Pole. 
Such comportment contradicts Viatcheslav Gavrilov’s argument in which he indicates that 
Russia as a responsible player, and proves that the Arctic is a region of Russian great 
interest.31 When Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic is compared to that of the other 
littoral states, concerns about future conflicts in the region appear to be real.32  
Third, this thesis argues that the tensions between Russia and the other littoral states 
stem from the activities that the Putin regime has undertaken to protect its national interests 
in the Arctic. Also, natural disasters and weather climate change recognize no borders or 
states identities and may turn into a cradle of tensions in the region. Another thing to 
consider is to determine the challenges that are faced by the United States and the Arctic 
rim states such as Canada, Denmark and Norway deterring Russia influence and avoiding 
futile escalation of force in the Arctic region. 
Conflicts between the five Arctic rim states substantially framed the geo-political 
status of the area. According with Laruelle, there have been eight bilateral disputes over 
EEZ boundaries, of which Russia has been involved in two: with the United States over 
the Bering Sea and with Norway over the Barents Sea and Svalbard Archipelago.33 Despite 
the fact that both disputes are now resolved, the last after more than 40 years of 
                                                 
30 Viatcheslav Gavrilov, “Russian Arctic Policy,” in Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and 
Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World, ed. Whitney Lackenbauer and Suzanne Lalonde 
(Canadian Affairs Institute, 2019), 1–13. 
31 Alexander Nurnberg, “An Arctic Circle Chase Pits Norway and Russia,” The New York Times, 
October 21, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/21/international/europe/an-arctic-circle-chase-pits-
norway-and-russia.html; Tom Parfitt, “Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed,” The Guardian, August 2, 
2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic. 
32 Wezeman, “Military Capabilities in the Arctic.” 
33 Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North, 94–95. 
10 
negotiations, there is still room from interpretation and arguments.34 In the same context, 
disputes can also occur from the legal status of regulating transit through the Northwest 
Passage and the Northeast Passage as well as territorial claims based on the continental 
shelf (Lomonosov Ridge and Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge).35 Laruelle remarks that Russia is 
involved in all three types of legal disputes: “those concerning the delineation of EEZ 
boundaries, the delimitation of the continental shelf but also in those concerning the vessel 
transit.”36 Against this confrontational background, different types of scenarios can lead 
to situations that are evolving and putting additional pressure and stress on the capabilities 
of the United States and its allies, such as tourist or maritime ships stuck in the icy waters, 
violation of regulations regarding economic activities in disputed territories (based on the 
status of the EEZ or on the status of the continental shelf) and different interpretations of 
bilateral treaties, one example being the use of the Svalbard island for military purposes. 
In response to this, and to maintain the region’s security status quo, NATO needs 
to develop and deliver a comprehensive strategy to challenge of Russia’s visible 
ascendancy. This thesis does not attempt to define this strategy, focusing instead on the 
costs and the benefits of such a measure.  
The Arctic, since the end of the Cold War has proven to be a place where most 
countries have advocated peace, stability, and cooperation. However, concerns over 
potential new or unsettled claims that could lead to regional disputes, increased the 
attention on the UNCLOS, with the international agreement being the sole document with 
its guiding principles o0n how nations should make use of the Arctic waters. As of March 
8, 2020, there were 168 countries that ratified the treaty.37 The United States did not ratify 
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the treaty, however it willingly accepts it, and acts accordingly as long as its rights and 
freedom are accepted, not only in the Arctic, but also in international waters.38  
On this background, what will a strategy delivered by the United States as a lead 
nation and its NATO partners from the Arctic will look like to minimize and deter 
Russian ambition over the Arctic?  
Russia, the only non-NATO Arctic coastal state, ratified UNCLOS, and by its claim 
to reach the North Pole it overlaps in part with territory of Denmark and Canada.39 Even 
if defensive by some scholars, adding the Russian military build-up in the region, new 
efforts need to be made to address military security and to maintain the region’s ‘low 
tension’ status.40 
As stated earlier, individually there is little that each of the Arctic states will do to 
prevent Russia’s activities in the Arctic.41 It becomes difficult to address these challenges 
and to preserve Arctic’s balance, especially now, with China’s involvement and a possible 
partnership with Russia, as China identifies herself as a “Near-Arctic-State.”42 China’s 
interest in the Arctic may be an advantage for Russia but also an opportunity for the United 
States and NATO to create a competition between China and Russia to weaken the ties 
between these two countries.  
At the same, there is a general misunderstanding that NATO is already involved in 
the Arctic. Also, as mentioned previously there is no international institution that focuses 
38 Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 10. 
39 European Parliament, “Arctic Continental Shelf Claims. Mapping Interests in the Circumpolar 
North,” January 2017, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/595870/
EPRS_BRI(2017)595870_EN.pdf. 
40 Mathieu Boulegue, “Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic,” Chatham House, June 2019, 
https://reader.chathamhouse.org/russia-s-military-posture-arctic-managing-hard-power-low-tension-
environment. 
41 The term Arctic states refers to eight nations, consisting of a core of five coastal, littoral or rim 
states (Canada, Denmark - by the virtue of Greenland, a member country of the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Norway, Russia and the United States) plus three ‘non-coastal states (Iceland, Finland and Sweden) 
42 James Foggo III, “Russia, China Offer Challenges in the Arctic,” Defense One, July 10, 2019, 
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/07/russia-china-offer-challenges-arctic/158303/. 
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on security in the Arctic, as a result, NATO remains the only international institution 
capable of addressing it. The United States cooperation within the alliance will contribute 
to Arctic security and deter possible opponents from expanding their influence in the 
Arctic. A NATO Arctic strategy, together with an increased presence in the frigid waters 
of the Arctic, may be the looked-for solution to a secure and stable region where states’ 
national interests are maintained and challenges are commonly and cooperatively shared 
to preserve the existing order in the Arctic. 
NATO needs a course of action to enhance its activity in the Arctic. But this needs 
to be done without Russia perceiving that the alliance is trying to displace and constrain it 
as NATO did in Eastern Europe. The study will determine how this action will balance the 
thin equilibrium in the Arctic region and whether the extra costs of this approach will 
outweigh the benefits. Outlying the implications and investigating how to prevent possible 
scenarios in which Russia maintains the trump card on ice waters is a challenge we need 
to consider in our future discussions about the Arctic.  
13 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Russia’s policy towards the Arctic, is the subject of many discussions in the 
academic community, with an emphasis on its security strategies. However, the literature 
review of this study will explore Russia’s pursuits in the Arctic, and will examine the 
economic, military-strategic, and national pride motivations that are driving those pursuits. 
Moreover, it will review the literature related to Russia’s activities in the Arctic and provide 
an overview of the Arctic as a region of cooperation or conflict. 
A. RUSSIA’S PURSUIT IN THE ARCTIC 
Considering Russia’s pursuit into the Arctic, the literature consulted will assume 
that the state demeanor is pushed by its economic interest and national pride.  
1. Economic 
Some scholars claim that Russia’s attentiveness toward the Arctic comes from a 
desire to harvest its valuable resources. As Arctic ice continues to melt, access to these 
natural resources continue to increase.  
USGS estimated that the Arctic may contain 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered 
oil and up to 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas resources.43 The significance of 
AZRF as the most prolific producer of Russian gas and oil (95 percent and 70 percent 
respectively) is highlighted in Sergunin and Konyshev’s study.44 These same authors 
stated that Russian geologists discovered more than 200 oil and gas deposits in AZRF.45 
Also, their study emphasizes the importance of the AZRF in the economy of Russia; this 
region is abundant in mineral resources such as diamond (99 percent of total Russian 
production), platinum-group elements (98 percent), nickel and cobalt (over 80 percent), 
                                                 
43 USGS, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the 
Arctic Circle.” 
44 Sergunin and Konyshev, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy.” 
45 Sergunin and Konyshev. 
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chromium and manganese (90 percent), copper (60 percent), antimony, tin, tungsten, rare 
metals (between 50 per cent and 90 percent), and gold (about 40 percent).46  
It is also worth mentioning that the development and promotion of the NSR is one 
of Russia’s objectives in the Arctic. The Putin administration recognizes the NSR as a 
geostrategic asset in its Arctic Strategy, which was demonstrated in 2013 policy 
documents, with plans in the same year to begin regular naval patrols along the shipping 
lane.47 Unlocking and taking advantage of the icy waters of the Arctic, by reviving the 
Arctic route, is a goal of Moscow’s ambitions.  
The importance of the NSR for Russia domestic affairs is emphasized by well-
known scholars such as Laruelle. Laruelle also argues that although the NSR is extremely 
unlikely to become a busy international trade route, Moscow will enforce a soft security 
policy alongside with international cooperation the later mainly dedicated on search and 
rescue systems.48 An the same time, others scholars, such as Pavel Deviatkin, argue that 
that defending the NSR is a high priority for Russia in the Arctic, suggesting that Moscow’s 
actions and policies regarding the progress and defense of the NSR can be a source of 
potential for dissension over the route’s jurisdiction.49 
2. Military-Strategic 
The Arctic plays an important role in Russia’s defense strategy and has been 
highlighted in various security doctrines, especially after the early 2000s, when Putin’s 
ambitious agenda to restore Russia came to power. The feeling of a revisionist Russia 
towards the Arctic region, could have been triggered by its limited capacity to expand in 
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Europe and Asia, after illegal violations of the territorial integrity of The Republic of 
Moldova (1990), Georgia (2008), and Ukraine (2014).50 
However, authors such as Sergunin, point out that Russia’s strategies in the Arctic 
are balanced between a hard security strategy and a soft security strategy.51 Sergunin 
concludes that the soft security agenda (threats and challenges to its AZRF are domestic) 
is much more important. 
Moreover, Russia’s military strategies towards the Arctic seem to remain constant 
in contrast to its security agenda abroad, as Konyshev and Sergunin pointed out, and are 
aimed to three major goals: “to demonstrate and ascertain Russia’s sovereignty” over the 
AZRF, “to protect its economic interest in the High North,” and to validate its “great-power 
status.”52 An the same time, Russia’s military buildup in the last decade has been a goal-
oriented strategy aimed to challenge Western supremacy of an international order that 
Russia views as unfavorable to its interests, as James Sherr noticed in his article.53 
In a recent article from the Arctic Institute, Devyatkin highlights the fact that 
Russia’s presence in the Arctic is far below the level it was during the Cold War. 
Nonetheless, he also mentions that the significant increase of naval patrols in the region, 
the enhanced operational capabilities of submarines, and larger investments in defensive 
missile systems indicate that Russia is protecting its economic interests, thus suggesting 
that Russia is preparing for a possible conflict.54 A study from 2016, brings strong evidence 
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that Russia is taking big steps toward securing the Arctic: building more bases, 
repositioning troops into the region, investing in the icebreaker fleet, and technology and 
constructing the natural resource infrastructure with the overall and stated goal in its 
military doctrine of protection of “national interests in the Arctic.”55  
3. National Pride 
Russia seeks to control the Arctic and its natural resources in order to boost its 
economy. At the same time, Putin looks at the Arctic as a way of restoring Russia’s status 
as a global power by gaining support from its local audience.  
Russia’s tendency to the Arctic is oriented towards economic and social 
development, and at the same time in maintaining its sovereign interests in the region as a 
last desperate attempt “to seek great power, claiming nearly half the Arctic in a ploy for 
energy, power, and ultimately prestige.”56 This last claim of Russia is the most persuasive 
one. Multiple statements of Russian leaders, especially President Putin, make it even more 
credible when he tells the West that the “Arctic is an inalienable part of Russia. So, it has 
been and so it always will be.”57 Laruelle remarks that the Arctic is being used by the Putin 
regime as a “national-branding” effort in which the desired outcome is to reassert to the 
Western states that Russia is a “great power” and to appeal to Russia’s domestic audience 
to view the High North “as place of refuge.”58 The same view has been expressed by 
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Dmitri Trenin and Pavel Baev, who found that Russia looks at the Arctic “through a 
patriotic rather than an economic lens”.59  
However, other scholars such as Thomas Rotnem, concludes that if Russia’s Arctic 
strategy comes as a vain attempt, it will undermine the regime legitimacy rather than 
booster its confidence. Either way, Russia’s attempt to augment its status through its Arctic 
initiative may bring it political benefit in the international community.60 
B. RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC: THREAT OR RELIANCE? 
The end of the Soviet Union ends Russia’s supremacy in Arctic exploration, which 
has been visible most of the 20th century, the Soviet Union being “the world’s first country 
to begin the prospecting, exploration, and development of the Arctic.”61 The Arctic region 
came back into international attention in 2007 when Russia’s attention focused on the High 
North. Russia’s starting point can be revealed with the scientific expedition of two mini-
submarines that “reached the seabed more than two and a half miles beneath the North 
Pole,” and planted a one meter-high titanium Russian flag underwater to stake a symbolic 
claim to the energy riches of the Arctic.62 Although the action was a success for the 
Moscow’s scientific community, the act itself was “widely criticized in North America and 
Western Europe as an example of Russia’s forceful expansionism.”63 Many scholars were 
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worried that this act meant the beginning of a “new Cold War” between Russia and the 
West over the Arctic.64  
The action was followed by an announcement in September 2008 of Russia’s first 
(and only so far) Arctic policy, called “Russian Federation’s Policy for the Arctic to 
2020.”65 Moreover, the development strategy of the Arctic was approved again by Putin 
in February 2013, which became “The Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone of the 
Russian Federation and National Security for the Period up to 2020; hereinafter, Russia’s 
Arctic policy will be referred to in this thesis as the Strategy”66  While the document 
adopted in 2008, focused on the realization of Russia’s national interests, the second part 
of the Strategy highlights the role of Russia as a responsible international actor in line with 
principles and norms of international law and its international commitments, as was 
recently highlighted by Gavrilov is his study.67 Although the international community 
believes that Russia has an aggressive attitude towards the Arctic, Moscow’s official 
statements contradict that.  
Unlike Georgia or [Crimea/Ukraine], the Arctic region is not a country: it is an 
international region that is governed differently, a political space with blurred and 
contested borders. Although the Arctic has historically been spared major conflicts, some 
scholars, point out that, the region itself has the potential for legitimate security concerns.68 
Laruelle highlights the possibility that different countries’ actions may be misinterpreted 
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due to the high risk of potential circumstances (collisions, oil spills et) or small-scale 
tensions over resources.69  
On this background, Russia is perceived as the main actor that wants not only to 
operate in the Arctic but mostly to dominate it, through investments in infrastructure and 
research.70 Andrew Foxall takes this same view, sharing its main concerns about the 
expansion and restoration of Russia’s infrastructure in the Arctic, which creates a new 
defense landscape in the region.71 
However, the amount of confrontation in the region has not risen much. Backed by 
Russia’s declared strategic documents regarding the Arctic, some authors are contending 
with Russia’s scheme of using the Arctic as a soft power in its international strategy linked 
with its domestic goal into the region.72 Sergunin, makes a point in his article, and claims 
that Russia has an open agenda in the Arctic, and it will achieve its goals through 
international cooperation by vigorously participation in various initiatives and forums 
related to environmental research and assessment.73 
Other scholars believe that Russia’s ambitions over the Arctic are overstated and 
exaggerated. Mathieu Boulègue and Elizabeth Buchanan both argue that Russia’s 
assertiveness is predictable and, moreover, focused on defending its energy investments in 
the Arctic, and that the region continues to be a place for cooperation rather than conflict.74 
Statements from Russia but also from representative of Norway—a very active Arctic state, 
and also a NATO partner—point out that Russia is a “responsible actor in the High North,” 
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that Russia’s strengthening of force is just a necessity after years of little or no maintenance 
of its military capabilities.75 
In this context, it may be necessary to focus on future Russian violations of 
international laws in order to highlight its duplicity in using international law to legitimize 
illegitimate gains. 
C. SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE ARCTIC 
Since 2007, most of the Western states have increased military patrols in the Arctic 
in response to the perceived threat from Russia. All of the Arctic littoral states, which are 
NATO allies as well (Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States), have conceived 
Arctic strategies that focus on strengthening the defense of their respective territories 
(internal waters, territorial seas, exclusive economic zones).76 Andrew Kramer, a reporter 
based in the Moscow bureau of The New York Times even stated that, though the North 
Pole is in international waters, Russia still claims it as being part of the continental shelf of 
the Russian Federation, with a formally staked claim at the United Nations based on a broad 
range of scientific data collected over many years of Arctic exploration.77 It is a broad 
claim, well within Russia’s rights under UNCLOS, but also both Denmark and Canada 
have done the same thing.78 
Recently, the importance of the Arctic for the United States was strongly 
emphasized by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the 2019 meeting of the Arctic 
Council in Finland, when he stated that the United States is entering a “new age of strategic 
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engagement in the Arctic.”79 Also, he pointed out that Russia’s and China’s “aggressive 
behavior” in other parts of the world increases the risk of having the same behavior in the 
Arctic.80 
The Arctic was of strategic interest to the United States during the height of the 
Cold War. A report by Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut regarding United States interests 
in the Arctic noted that the region itself was a geopolitical playground for the United States 
and the Soviet Union, including a race to the polar cap with strategic bombers and nuclear 
submarines, which lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union.81  
However, the Arctic has always been strategically important for Russia. In 2008, 
2013, 2014, 2017, and recently in March 2020, Moscow has outlined a strategy to 
consolidate Russia’s “Arctic military capabilities, strengthen territorial sovereignty and 
develop the region’s infrastructure for gathering its valuable resources.”82 
By contrast, the same thing cannot be said about the United States over time. 
Russia’s investment in the Arctic has given it an advantage over the United States, but 
recently the United States has taken minimal steps to show that it is catching up. The 2019 
United States Arctic Strategy drew attention to the lack of U.S. military capabilities for the 
Arctic and calls for increasing awareness to enhance Arctic operations and to strengthen 
the rules-based in the Arctic.83 
To secure its sovereign waters and partly wishing to control its maritime routes, 
Russia has steadily built up and modernized its military component, as part of the effort to 
create a comprehensive presence in the Arctic and to position itself for the future.  
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Presumably, the biggest concern of Russia is the expansion of NATO in the Arctic 
region. Russian’s academics and top politicians, such as Dmitry Medvedev or Vladimir 
Putin, have expressed concerns about a “NATO Exclusion Zone” through numerous 
statements regarding NATO enlargement toward Russia’s borders as has been done.84 
Other scholars such as James Whither, draw attention to the Norwegian 
archipelago, Svalbard, where the danger of an armed conflict could surface from 
misjudgment or opportunism, due to the disputed status of the islands.85 However, Laruelle 
points out that Russia has largely accepted Norwegian jurisdiction over Svalbard, even 
though it demands special status due to its historical association with the archipelago.86 
With expectations of increasing the use of NSR as the main shipping route from 
Asia to Europe, Russia has imposed legislation to increase its control over managing access 
to the NSR through icebreakers that can frame ships.87 Russia’s intentions are clear. If you 
need to sail through the Arctic, you will agree with the Russian oversight. The United States 
Department of Defense (DOD) points out that the maritime route has the potential for 
conflict, due to Russia’s numerous threats to use force against those who do not comply 
with Russian regulations concerning the NSR.88 
A number of academics are also concerned about Russia’s growing military 
assertiveness in the Arctic and its strategic implications for the United States and its allies. 
A recent report emphasized the increased operational tempo, scale, and testing of nuclear 
weapons of Russian’s military exercises in the Arctic, with different scenarios and 
outcomes such as defending and securing the GIUK Gap and blocking the English Channel 
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(the August 2019 Ocean Shield Exercise), testing newly designed Arctic military 
equipment (Tsentr -19) or incorporating all its Arctic fleets and troops in launching nuclear 
warheads and other ballistic missiles (Grom-19).89     
Concurrently, other scholars such as Boulegue and Buchanan claim that, although 
the military exercises are large and with a growing significant in size and complexity, they 
mostly are predictable and often have defense purposes.90 
As a conclusion, the academic community is debating whether or not Russia is a 
responsible and predictable stability factor in the Arctic region that is interested in fostering 
regional cooperation and keeping the High North out of tension. Other observers question 
the above argument, emphasizing the military posture of Russia as a sign of future 
aggressiveness, and arguing that Moscow is taking steps to secure its interests in the Arctic.   
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III. RUSSIA’S INTERESTS IN THE ARCTIC 
“Arctic resources are key to Russia’s future,” Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev, 200891 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, the Arctic has lost 
in its significance for Russia, for almost a decade; thus, its military and economic potential 
are being underestimated. Nowadays, Russia’s strategies in the Arctic are a matter of 
continuing debate both in the academic community and in the international security 
policies. It is commonly known, and everyone agrees that Russia has the largest territory, 
population, and the highest military presence in the Arctic than any other state. According 
with Laruelle, “the Arctic zone is home to only 1 percent of Russia’s population, but 
represents 11 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) and 22 percent of its exports.”92 
Therefore, Russia is in the way to achieving its first and foremost objective of transforming 
the Arctic into one of its main drilling and mining regions. 
As delineated in Figure 1, and being considered the definition in this study, “the 
Arctic defines the region as the land and sea north of the Arctic Circle (a circle of latitude 
at about 66o 34’ North),” to comprise territories “within eight sovereign states (Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the USA),” and contain “about 
4 million people” (half of them living in Russia’s part of the Arctic) spread across an 
approximately “8.14 million square miles area surrounding the Arctic Ocean, accounting 
for about 4 percent of the Earth’s surface.”93 
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 The Arctic Circle and the Arctic Nations94 
Compared to the United States, which commits rather little importance to the Arctic 
in and to the region’s resources such as petroleum and oil, the Arctic for Russia is of 
immense importance due to “a combination of security, economic and identity reasons.”95 
Moreover, of all the five Arctic rim states, Russia has considerably the greatest rooted 
interests in the region, being in the same time the country with the longest Arctic coastline 
as seen in Figure 1, thus presumed to yield the most from Arctic’s resources.96 Russia’s 
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views about the region changed two decades ago, when the Arctic was recognized as a key 
economic resource. Putin administration ratify its “Energy Strategy for Russia up to 2022,” 
with high interests in the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, and the Yamal Peninsula; this 
happened concurrently with the start of Russia’s process of re-nationalizing its oil and gas 
companies.97 
Moscow’s proactive policies, towards the Arctic region emphasize the importance 
of the High North for Russia. The Arctic’s low strategic priority for the United States and 
its allies in the North created a window of opportunity for Russia, which has taken some 
significant steps toward gaining regional superiority, starting with Putin administration, in 
early 2000.  
This chapter will be focused on Russia’s economic ambitions for harvesting the 
Arctic resources and investing in the infrastructure of the NSR, the Arctic route which 
connects the Kola Peninsula (situated far northwest of Russia, inside the Arctic Circle 
bordered by the Barents Sea in the north, the White Sea in the east and southeast, and the 
Finland and Norway in the west and northwest, as seen in Figure 1 ) with the Bearing Strait. 
It will also examine Russia’s process of securing its Arctic borders as part of Russia 
aspirations to promote its political legitimacy as a great power both domestically and 
internationally. 
A. ECONOMIC AMBITIONS 
Due to its geographical position, the economic gamble associated with 
development of the Arctic’s natural resources abundance is of great importance for Russia, 
“as the region is rich in raw materials, accounting for most of Russia’s extraction of oil, 
gas, copper, cobalt, nickel and platinum,” and also offers “some military advantages (for 
example, the shortest linear distance to U.S. territory).”98 Moscow is determined to harness 
the Arctic sea by extracting its resources and looking at commercial opportunities in the 
High North. Its main goal is to take advantage of the region’s abundance of oil and gas. 
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Russia already possesses and exploits more than half of all Arctic’s estimated hydrocarbons 
resources, as presented in Table 1.99  
Table 1. Distribution of Estimated Arctic Oil and Gas Resources among the 
Arctic Five States100 
 
However, Russia’s economic weight is the extraction and production of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG). Russia took a chance in the Yamalo-Nemets district, located above the 
Arctic Circle in western Siberia; the region is consider the world’s largest natural gas 
producing area the Arctic Circle, with the main gas fields situated in the Yamal and Gydan 
Peninsula (Figure 1).101 The gas fields in the region are accountable for approximately 90 
percent of Russia’s current natural gas production, 45 percent of its reserve, and 20 percent 
of the world’s gas production.102 
                                                 
99 Keil, “The Arctic.” 
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Rank Country 
Total estimated resources in oil equivalent 
(billion barrels) 
Percentage 
1.  Russia 215.94 52 
2.  USA 83.31 20 
3.  Norway 47.46 12 
4.  Denmark/ Greenland 44.49 11 
5.  Canada 22.08 5 
 Total 413.28 100 
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Yamal LNG, which was launched in 2013 as one of the largest and most complex 
LNG plant projects in the world, reached full capacity in 2017, and provides annually 16.5 
million tons of LNG, which represents more than 5 percent of the world market, according 
to the official release of its investors.103 A second extraction complex, Arctic LNG2, is 
currently under development in the Gydan Peninsula, with an estimated production of 19.8 
million tons of LNG per year, at full capacity.104  
 
 Yamal and Gydan Peninsulas, and Sabetta Port.105 
In May 2019, Russia’s largest natural gas company, Novatek, also the owner of the 
previous two projects, announced the start of the development of a third LNG plant, Ob 
LNG, which will be built in Sabetta near the Yamal LNG facility. The plant will produce 
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an estimated 5 million tons of LNG per year and is forecast to reach full capacity in around 
2023.106  
The private company Novatek had also impacted the region’s overall infrastructure 
and freedom of movement. The port of Sabetta (see Figure 1), has become the center of the 
three main projects of the company, and furthermore, the company’s and Russia’s efforts 
to export the valuable LNG have called for the construction of the new generation of  
nuclear icebreakers, named the Arktika class.107 The company’s plans are directly related 
with Russia’s objectives, as Russia’s Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin has emphasized 
the role of this fleet of powerful modern icebreakers, to unlock the potential transport of 
NSR; to enhance the economic interest between Europe and Asia, and of course, to ensure 
the primacy of Russia in the Arctic.108 From a diplomatic point, on the background of 
sanctions imposed by the Western states, Russia succeed to find alternatives in 
international cooperation by signing an agreement with a British group to build a LNG 
factory, and more important by attracting China which now controls 20 percent of Yamal 
LNG’s shares.109  
Thus, one of Russia’s main objectives in the Arctic is the development, promotion, 
and control of the NSR as an international route. As the Arctic Ocean’s icepack decreases, 
domestic and foreign transit through the NSR has risen significantly. With traffic through 
the NSR estimated by Vladimir Putin from the current ratio of 17 million tons to 80 million 
tons of cargo per year in 2024, and optimistic forecast ranging from 26 to 92 million tons 
per year by 2030 by several federal officials, Western analysts agree that the NSR might 
                                                 
106 Atle Staalesen, “Novatek Announces 3rd LNG Project in Arctic,” The Independent Barents 
Observer, May 23, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2019/05/novatek-
announces-3rd-lng-project-arctic. 
107 Laruelle, “Russia’s Arctic Policy”; Malte Humpert, “Novatek Arctic LNG 2 Project Remains on 
Schedule Despite Impact Of Covid-19,” June 30, 2020, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/novatek-arctic-
lng-2-project-remains-schedule-despite-impact-covid-19. 
108 Rustem Falyakhov, “Russia in ‘Leaders’: How Icebreakers Surf the Budget,” Газета.Ru, June 15, 
2020, https://www.gazeta.ru/business/2020/06/15/13118977.shtml. 
109 Laruelle, “Russia’s Arctic Policy.” 
31 
result in large opportunities, since it would shorten the sea route between Europe and Asia, 
by one third.110 
The Putin administration recognizes the NSR as a geostrategic asset in its Arctic 
Strategy, which was demonstrated in 2013 policy documents, with plans in the same year 
to begin regular naval patrols along the shipping lanes.111 Concurrently, in 2017 Russia 
enacted a law, followed by amendments in the following years, restricting the transport on 
foreign-flagged ships of Russian energy resources such as oil, natural gas and coal through 
the NSR. This law is intended to protect the Russian shipbuilding industry, with one 
noteworthy exception, the private company Novatek, whose powerful icebreaking LNG 
carriers fly foreign flags, of South Korea.112 At the same time, transit through the NSR has 
been restricted to foreign warships which are required to notify the Russian government 45 
days in advance. The legislation is contrary to maritime law, where authorization for transit 
is required within 12 nautical miles of territorial waters.113 These measures are aligned 
with Russia’s policy of ensuring the right to regulate the traffic through NSR, as it considers 
the maritime route to be part of its territory; this stance is at odds with those of other states, 
which support the freedom of navigation on the oceans, such as the United States which 
considers these restrictions to be inconsistent with the international law. The United States 
Navy challenges them constantly, as part of its wider Freedom of navigation Operations 
(FONOPS) program.114 
Besides oil and gas, the AZRF is very important for the economy of Russia, 
because, as Sergunin and Konyshev have pointed out, the region is abundant as well in 
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mineral resources, including 99 percent Russia’s total production of diamonds, 98 percent 
of its platinum-group elements, over 80 percent of its nickel and cobalt, 90 percent of its 
chromium and manganese, 60 percent of its copper, between 50 percent and 90 percent of 
its antimony, tin, tungsten, rare metals and about 40 percent of its gold.115 Thus, 
controlling and dominating the Arctic has been of great importance for Russia’s global and 
domestic politic purposes, particularly after Putin’s return to the presidency in 2010 and 
internal demonstrations against it from 2011–2013.116 
Against this background, it is not surprising at all that Russia has been the first 
country to submit a claim for recognition of its territory, under the UNCLOS, reaching now 
to have more claims of Arctic lands and seas than any other country, including large areas 
of the ocean, as part of its EEZ.117 This gives Russia the opportunity to gain new territories, 
with their related natural resources. However, natural resources have a limited character, 
therefore, they are being used as tools of foreign policies, which is what Russia has been 
doing in terms of natural gas. 
In addition to capitalizing on the Arctic resources and growing its economy based 
on these resources, it appears that Russia’s increased focus on the High North is also 
vouched on strengthening its international prestige vis-a-vis the West, as well as justifying 
its narratives with regard to the Arctic to its domestic audience. Russia seeks power and 
influence due to geographical and economic advantages that the Arctic has enhanced.  
However, Russia itself cannot sustain the development and potential use of its 
AZRF without cooperation with foreign countries, as seen in Yamal LNG projects where 
Novatek, the Russian company and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
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partnered in 2013 to fund the Yamal LNG project; the tradeoff is often perceived by Russia 
as offsetting the advance stand in economic Arctic matters.118  
B. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 
To secure and achieve its economic gamble, Russia needs to prioritize safeguarding 
its vision of national security in the AZRF. Russia can spur tensions with the Western 
countries, due to the existence of Russian interests in the Arctic, and which, in addition, 
Russia is committed to protecting them.119  
In addition to supporting Russia’s economic interests, the Arctic, unlike the Black 
Sea or Baltic Sea, gives Russia the possibility of direct access to the world’s oceans, 
creating opportunities for power projection into other regions, primarily into the North 
Atlantic. Therefore, the Arctic has strategic importance for Russia’s military, as well as for 
the other Arctic states, particularly for the United States. 
Russia has increased its military presence in the sea, air, and land in the Arctic area, 
both physically and declaratively, to maintain the objectives set out in its various security 
doctrines. In his chapter from a report regarding Russia’s Strategic Intentions, Devyatkin 
stated that the Russian military presence in the Arctic has three strategic objectives: “to 
protect [the] national sovereignty in the region, to secure economic interests, and to 
demonstrate that Russia remains a great power with first rate-military capabilities.”120 The 
Arctic is seen as of strategic importance for Russia, and moreover, as Boulegue concluded, 
Russia’s policymakers have “accorded the same threat perception… [to the region itself] 
as it has to other theaters of operation.”121 
According to Ekaterina Klimenko, but also other researchers such as those from the 
Warsaw Institute, the reasons for Russia’s increase in military capabilities in the Arctic are 
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twofold.122 First, Russia is acknowledging the changing of the Arctic environment, which 
brings new security challenges related to the projected increased shipping along the NSR 
and the need to protect its longest coastline, which has opened up due to melting sea ice.123 
Secondly, in addition of controlling the Arctic’s natural resources and shipping 
lanes, Russia’s military growth in the Arctic is linked to the issue of seeking to maintain 
strategic parity with the United States and NATO. The Arctic region may easily become a 
place where tensions that arise elsewhere between the two great powers may spill over into 
the Arctic region.124 
According to Boulegue, Russia has a militarized risk appraisement for its Arctic, 
while pursuing “consistent control over foreign military activity” in the region and ensuring 
freedom of maneuver for its own armed forces.125 This gives Moscow a sense of perceived 
military superiority as it considers the Arctic to be in its convenient position of strength.126 
Hence, the Arctic holds a unique place in Russia’s defense strategy, especially the Kola 
Peninsula and its surroundings, as implementing the “Bastion” defense concept, further 
west to the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap (Figure 3).127 
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 Russia’s Bastion Defense Concept and GIUK Gap128 
The Bastion concept introduced by the Ministry of Defense at the beginning of the 
1990s, aims to guarantee “both the security of the Kola Peninsula and access… [for 
Russia’s] fleet to the North Atlantic [Ocean] and beyond,” as well as securing the NSR.129 
Consequently, the Bastion concept, centered on the Kola Peninsula, is particularly 
concerned with protecting Russia’s sea-based nuclear assets, which ensure the likeliness of 
surviving for a second-strike nuclear response, but also to maintain Russia’s defense in 
depth.130 
The perimeter concerning the Bastion defense concept is aligned with the Russian 
military buildup around its resources throughout the Arctic. Steve Schneider wrights that 
this buildup consists of “the addition of a new Arctic command, four new combat brigades, 
13 new airfields protected by S-400 long-range surface-to-air missiles, 16 deep-water ports, 
                                                 
128 Source: Harri Mikkola, “The Geostrategic Arctic: Hard Security in the High North,” April 2019 
129 Boulegue, “Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic,” 7. 
130 Boulegue, 6. 
36 
and a fleet of 40 icebreakers, with 11 new ones on the way.”131 This buildup is to enhance 
the capabilities of the Arctic Force Structure of Russia, whose main objective is to secure 
its economic interests along the borders of the AZRF. It is easy to see that it is connected 
with the oil, gas and mineral reserves of Russia (see Figure 4). 
Issues related to the Arctic region will remain on Russia’s political agenda and will 
extend through the term of the current administration in Moscow. However, Russia’s 
military build-up, which is currently justified as defensive, may have a more offensive 
outline with “respect to NATO and its partners.”132 
                                                 
131 Steve Schneider, “The Arctic Buildup: A New Cold War,” Richardcyoung.Com, April 11, 2018, 
https://www.richardcyoung.com/essential-news/the-arctic-buildup-a-new-cold-war/. 
132 Boulegue, “Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic,” 35. 
37 
 
 Russia Securing its Resources in AZRF133 
C. NATIONAL PRIDE, BRAND IN INTERNATIONAL SCENE 
As emphasized above, besides significant economic interest, Russia considers the 
Arctic of strategic interests. The Kola Peninsula acts as a primary instrument in the 
country’s nuclear deterrence strategy, as it hosts the Russian Navy’s nuclear fleet.134 
However, Russia’s interest in the Arctic is more than that.  
The importance of the region is part of a larger context; the acknowledgment of 
nationalism and patriotism as way of justification and promotion of political legitimacy 
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domestically.135 The Arctic plays a great role, as well, on the international scene, where 
Russia views the Arctic region’s role as affirming its prestige and status as a great power, 
proclaiming that this will promote dialog and international cooperation instead of 
confrontation, but also from a security point of view and domestically.136 
As seen above, Russia’s policy of re-mastering the Arctic, both in terms of 
economic prospects and military dominance, is a response equally to legitimate concerns 
and international status. Thus, Vladimir Putin succeeded to create an “Arctic brand” during 
its first two tenures based on international cooperation with Russia as a self-assumed 
leader.137 Thereby, the Arctic grants itself an opportunity not be missed.  
According with Laruelle, a successful “Arctic brand” offers Russia to “turn its 
competition with the United States to its advantage,” particularly given the latter’s non-
ratification of several international engagements and protocols.138 Russia’s collaborative 
behavior has roots on the already positive role played in most of the Arctic institutions, 
such as: the Arctic Council, BEAC, joint SAR agreements, and scientific cooperation.139 
At the same time, Russia’s new Arctic Policy document – Basic Principles of 
Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic – adopted by the Putin administration in 
March 2020, puts forward the concept of “ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity” as 
the high national interest in the context of the Arctic.140 As well as the previous policy 
from 2008, the new document signals continuity rather than change, but also brings new 
goals, interests and mechanism of implementation for the next 15 years, such as developing 
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the NSR and promoting the well-being and prosperity of the Arctic people.141 
Concurrently, according to Putin, the new strategy will strengthen the legal framework and 
organization for the implementation of projects and programs, investment plans of 
infrastructure companies and programs development in the Arctic.142 
While the new Arctic policy also refers to the major constraints to guarantee 
Moscow’s national security in the region, its main agenda points out that Russia will 
preserve and encourage cooperation on multiple matters, including the delimitation of the 
Arctic shelf, SAR operations in the region, and strengthening the Arctic Council institution, 
as the “key regional institution coordinating the international cooperation in the Arctic.”143 
Given the fact that in 2021, for a period of two years,  Russia will mandate the chair of the 
Arctic Council, the priority of strengthening the institution is not a surprise, as the 
“presidency will be crucial for Russia’s strategy of reintegrating the international 
community,” after its relations with the Western states have been deteriorated in the last 
years.144 
However, the Russian strategic posture in the Arctic remains increasingly 
ambitious, assertive, and sometime even overtly aggressive, especially in the matter of 
protecting the AZRF, in order to secure its economic interests. The coherent and purpose-
driven Russian ambitions and actions in the Arctic are gradually challenging the fragile 
balance in the region, being part of the wider and more general Russian policies and actions 
aimed at eroding the power status of Western states, which Russia’s state administration 
perceives as harmful to its interests and vulnerable, which also could potentially lead to 
conflict.145 
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Russia’s Arctic policy to retain control and secure its Arctic perimeter has been 
successful, and is reflected in its approach to the three major goals: strategic control of 
vitally important sea routes, such as NSR; strategic control of natural resources in the 
region; and deterring or containing the presence and action of its strategic competitors, 
especially the United States and its allies. However, whatever the motives for its actions, 
Russia’s demeanor in the Arctic is creating a new landscape in the region focused on 
competition but still vulnerable to future conflicts. 
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IV. RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC 
Russian military activities in the Arctic region are driven by the erratic and unclear  
geopolitical space, the existence of a great Russian national interest in the region and 
finally, its view of the Arctic as a Russian national territory.146 Therefore, its tough posture 
and military actions shall cease to be count as isolated, given Russia’s growing altercations 
with the Western countries, and on the background of previous hostile actions from Europe 
and the economic sanctions imposed on them.147 
Since beginning of the Putin regime, after more than a decade of looking away from 
the High North, Russia has pursued a renewed interest in the Arctic. This chapter looks at 
Russia’s activities in the Arctic, looking whether, how and under what circumstances 
Russia is likely to engage in an international confrontation, to protect its national interests 
or to reaffirm its position as a great power, domestically and in the international arena. It 
outlines Russia’s claims and actions in the region, it looks for possible conflicts in the 
Arctic and prospects for their resolution; it examines if Russia is a revisionist power by the 
threats both perceived and posed in the region. The legal endeavor that Russia is pursuing 
in the Arctic, as well as the military actions at the threshold of the law that Russia is 
carrying out, lays the groundwork on which Russia’s effort relies. 
Lacking opportunities to expand further into the West, Russia has begun to advance 
its confrontational posture in the Arctic. Russia’s actions there have raised concerns, due 
to its obvious and unprecedented military modernization, its military assertiveness, and its 
development of the North Sea Route, all of which have become increasingly important in 
Russian politics and official documents. At the same time, Sergunin and Konyshev point 
out the opinion of some Western analysts, who believe that Russia, “due to economic 
weakness and technological backwardness, tends to privilege coercive military instruments 
to protect its national interest in the Arctic.”148 
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A. NOT SO LEGAL AFFAIRS IN THE ARCTIC 
Russia’s Arctic actions are based on several nation strategic documents, including: 
Basic Principles of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic to 2035 (adopted in 
2020); Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (adopted in 2014); The National 
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2020 (adopted in 2008), The Merchant 
Shipping Code (adopted in 1999).149  
Although these different and ambitious Arctic policies do not contravene with the 
provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS (which Russia ratified in March 1997),  that ensure legal 
rights of each of the five coastal Arctic states, the above documents articulate Russia’s 
intent to secure its legitimate interests, investing in the improvement of AZRF, which is 
abundant in mining resources but less developed when it comes with infrastructure, and 
defending its self-legitimate rights on the extended continental shelf.150 
1. Who Will Own the North Pole? 
Russia has sent numerous messages, both declarative and symbolic, to endorse, its 
territorial claims in the Arctic, but what stand up is the race to conquer the North Pole and 
its surroundings. Currently, the North Pole is under international jurisdiction; however, 
under the UNCLOS, Russia, Denmark and Canada have staked claims to the continental 
shelf Lomonosov Ridge that runs beneath the Pole. 
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 Continental Shelf Submissions in the Arctic151 
The UNCLOS established that all coastal states on the Arctic Ocean benefit from 
an EEZ covering up to 200 nautical miles (370 km) from shore.152 Also, according to the 
UNCLOS, Arctic states can claim offshore seabed beyond the 200 nautical mile limit if the 
underwater geology shows that the seabed is actually an extension of their landmass, as 
part of their portion of the continental shelf. A continental shelf is a shallow extension of 
the continent’s landmass under the ocean, and is important as it gives rights to the sovereign 
state to explore and exploit the natural resources, found in the soil and sub-soil, as opposed 
to an EEZ, which grants the state permission to exploit only marine resources (fish, etc.) 
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and seabed resources (sponges, etc.) from the water column.153 Overlapping continental 
shelf as depicted in Figure 5, are at the forefront of legal disputes, which derive from some 
countries’ desired further development of their EEZs - based on the previous geological 
expertise - as a natural extension of the continental shelf of a given country. 
In 2001, Russia was the first country to submit a claim on the offshore seabed, 
including both the Mendeleev and Lomonosov Ridges, as well as the North Pole, as natural 
extensions of Russia’s continental shelf (see Figure 6).154 Since then, Russia has been 
proven to be by far the most aggressive in their claims, reaching the point of planting a 
titanium flag on the seabed in 2007, as part of a scientific expedition where soil samples 
were collected.155 The exploration was perceived ostensibly to be within the scientific 
framework of the 2007–2008 International Polar Year, as it had both a global undertaking 
and a national purpose as well. After this controversial mission and another scientific 
expedition in 2012, Russia submitted additional evidence in 2015 to CLCS, arguing that 
the Lomonosov Ridge is a continental extension of the Russian mainland.156 In 2016, 
among other evidence of previous submissions, it added the Mendeleev Elevation and the 
Chukchi high plain to its revised claim (see Figure 6).157 
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 The Arctic Ocean Disputed Seabed158 
If Russia is granted the territories it has requested, it will gain an additional 1.2 
million square kilometers of the Arctic sea shelf, which will extend more than 350 nautical 
miles (650 km) from the shore.159 The new expansion of Russia’s territory comes with the 
right to the resources located below the seabed as well, with estimates of 594 new oil and 
159 new gas fields, as well as two large nickel fields and over 350 gold fields.160 Also, 
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initial recoverable fuel resources are estimated to 258 billion tons of fuel equivalent, 
accounting for 60 percent of the actual Russia’s total hydrocarbon resources.161 
Russia’s claim created tensions with Denmark, as Greenland, which is a sovereign 
state of Denmark, also submitted a partial submission to CLCS, claiming that the area 
surrounding the North Pole, part of the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of its 
landmass.162 At the same time, after more than a decade of research and a partial claim in 
2013, Canada, the second biggest Arctic state, took a stand in the Arctic matters when it 
advanced a submission to CLCS claiming the seabed under the North Pole for itself, 
bringing evidence that the Lomonosov ridge is part of its own continental shore.163 
As of now, the overlapping claims are waiting for a peaceful and fair resolution 
form the CLCS. However, there is a potential for tensions concerning this matter. Laruelle 
points out that if the CLCS refuses to confirm the respective claims, some states could be 
tempted to find gaps in the law, in their favor.164 Russia, for example, which has invested 
billions of dollars to gather scientific evidence, could strengthen its posture, and perhaps 
even be expected to disregard international law, while being prepared domestically to 
deviate from the scientific arguments against it, making the possible negative ruling seem 
political or geopolitical.165 
On the other hand, a positive decision in the favor of Russia will foster its ambition 
as a global power, changing the geostrategic balance in its favor, and, in addition, will bring 
important economic prospects to Russia.166 
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2. The Argued Archipelago 
Another way for Russia to shift the weight of the argument in its direction and, 
more important, to challenge the West and its solidarity is through Norway’s Svalbard 
archipelago.167 The legal status of the Svalbard archipelago is highlighted by Laruelle, 
who points out that, following the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, Russia claims special rights 
among signatories due of its long history with the archipelago, in spite of the fact that it 
has overall recognized Norwegian sovereignty over the islands.168 Therefore, Russia sees 
the Svalbard archipelago in a crucial role for the country’s position in the Arctic. However, 
the archipelago remains an integral part of Norway. 
Disputes between the two countries derive from the different interpretations of the 
outdated agreement mentioned above, given three issues: the interpretation of the term 
“military purposes,” the status of the continental shelf surrounding the islands, and the 
status of the EEZs.169 
First and foremost, the two-side interpretation of the article concerning with de 
demilitarization of the Svalbard islands, lead to disagreements. Russia interprets the 
regulations of the treaty as forbidding all military activities in the area, including the use 
of the double-use facility of monitoring and surveillance systems, which Russia argues 
could be used for military purposes by NATO and the United States.170 Norway, on the 
other hand, understands the article differently, and therefore Svalbard islands are often used 
by the Norwegian armed force, especially the coast guard.171  
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Second, in 2003, Norway act unilaterally, but without violating the international 
norms,  and decided to expand its maritime territory around Svalbard under the aegis of the 
UNCLOS norm of 12 nautical miles (22 km), resulting in an increase of approximately 35 
percent of its territorial waters.172 This would give Norway exploitation rights to those 
waters; however, the change was recognized only by Canada and Finland and contested by 
other signatories of the treaty.173 Russia condemned Norway for applying domestic law to 
the archipelago.  
The last matter of friction between the two countries is the control of fisheries 
around Svalbard. In 1977, Norway established a new maritime zone where fishing is 
domestically regulated, but kept distinct from its own EEZ: the so-called Fisheries 
Protection Zone (FPZ).174 There have been many circumstances in which Russian fishing 
vessels were intercepted by the Norwegian coast guard and found in violation of different 
regulations. One incident was widely publicized and commented upon worldwide: that of 
the Russian trawler Elektron, which occurred in 2005.175 Elektron did not submit to arrest 
by the Norwegian Coast Guard; moreover it broke away from its escort and headed for the 
Russian coast with two Norwegian officers on board for more than three days. Eventually 
the officers were released when the trawler linked up with the Russian Coast Guard, but 
also after a vehement dialogue between the two governments.176  
This last incident was important as it occurred in a disputed place between the two 
countries it also brought attention to the necessity of enhanced cooperation between the 
Arctic states, especially in the matters of search and rescue, maritime awareness or legal 
rights to explore maritime resources. It is significant that the incident did not spiral out of 
control into a possible open conflict, even though it had all the characteristics of a crisis, 
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which could have been enhanced by the changing and challenging environment of the 
Arctic.177 
To sum up, the question of Svalbard has not been settled by international 
regulations, and the archipelago is yet exposed both politically and military being a 
potential focus of friction between the two countries, and in a larger context, NATO.  
The Russian stance on Arctic territorial conflicts goes beyond those mentioned. 
However, these issues are the most relevant in terms of identifying Russia as a revisionist 
power in the Arctic.  
B. MILITARY PROJECTIONS 
Despite Russia’s economic prospects in the Arctic, the region stands as essential in 
terms of military power and strategic value. Moscow looks to safeguard it by committing 
time and resources for its militarization. Therefore, its military buildup in the Arctic is 
certainly prominent in the competition between the West and itself, especially now in the 
face of the changing climate and environment.  
Looking at the Russian military footprint (Figure 7), one can observe that Russia 
has created a protective network of military bases across all its coastline and beyond, by 
refurbishing old airbases, SAR capabilities, and radar stations to enhance its overall domain 
awareness.178 Russia’s build-up is intended initially for territorial defense, but more 
important, is designed and aligned to secure Russia’s second-strike capabilities.179 As the 
hard security policies dominate the West’s perception of Russia, the Russian analyst 
Sergunin, argued in 2015 that, in the issue of the Arctic region, the strategic component is 
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different than the conventional component, and has nothing to do with the Arctic region 
and everything to do with Russia’s global confrontation with the United States.180 
However, Russia’s military posture surpasses the United States’ current posture 
across the region. In addition, a recent study by Center for Strategic & International Studies 
(CSIS) highlighted several scenarios that concluded that the United States not only will 
miss the power to access portion of the Arctic ocean by 2050, but Russian advances in its 
anti-access/ area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Arctic will make the United States 
“costs of entry” much higher, though making NATO a solution to deter Russian stance in 
the Arctic.181 
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 Russian Military Infrastructure in the Arctic.182 
Although most of the Arctic states have been upgrading their military capabilities 
in the region, it is Russia’s military buildup that is of primary concern.183 In addition to 
expanding the size of the Russian forces in the Arctic and modernizing their equipment, 
Russian assertiveness and military activities have also increased. Evidence of these will 
follow forward down. 
a. Sea Capabilities 
The Arctic Ocean, unlike the Black Sea or Baltic Sea, gives Russia the possibility 
of direct access to the world’s oceans, particularly to the North Atlantic. In the summer of 
2008, Russia resumed strategic patrols by the Northern Fleet in its Arctic waters for the 
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first time since the end of the Cold War.184 To this, Russia has directed its modernization 
efforts to its naval capacity, the Northern Fleet, which is responsible for its military 
operations in the Arctic. The Northern Fleet stands as the most powerful of the Russian 
Navy’s five fleets, with such impressive numbers such as 41 submarines (with more than 
75 percent nuclear powered) and 37 warships.185 With a strategy similar to that from the 
Cold War, Russia has continued to use the Arctic as the staging ground for its strategic 
nuclear capabilities, as it “decided to develop five of the… ballistic missile nuclear 
submarines (SSBN) equipped with the new solid fuel submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLMBs).”186 
Since the Northern Fleet equals almost two-thirds of the Russian navy’s nuclear 
strike capabilities, in December 20l4, it “was given independent status as the Joint Strategic 
Command North” (JSC North) and assumed command of “the air and ground units within 
its area of responsibility.”187 JSC main task is “to maintain the strategic forces in a state 
of constant readiness, and to ensure the survivability both of [the infrastructure on] the 
Kola Peninsula and of the strategic submarine assets” that are based there.188 Besides, 
protecting Russia’s EEZ from illegal activities and ensuring the safety of navigation, 
another priority of the Northern Fleet is to maintain and secure access “to the North Atlantic 
through the Barents and Norwegian Seas and further west via the GIUK gap.”189 
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b. Land Capabilities 
Like the Northern Fleet, the backbone of Russian land troops under the command 
of JSC North is the new Arctic Brigade. It was established and manned in 2015 from two 
army motorized brigades, “and is supplemented by Special Forces units from the 61st “Red 
Banner” Naval Infantry Brigade.”190 These units have are trained to perform strategic 
military operations in the Arctic, in a cold-weather environment, and are part of Russian’s 
plans to “balance the situation” with NATO forces in the Arctic.191 
c. Air Capabilities 
The least important part of Russia’s emerging Arctic Structure is its air assets, 
which consists mainly of the aircraft supporting the Northern Fleet, with limited range 
beyond the Russian territory.192 However, new airfields have been built or upgraded in the 
Arctic on the Russian mainland and the islands nearby from the Arctic Ocean.193 
According with Yu Koizumi, “most of those are radar bases and support facilities for the 
reconstruction of air defense networks in the Arctic,” where Russian officials have 
“deployed air defense and anti-ship missile units to defend them.”194  
Concurrently, in 2008 the first battalion of Arctic air defense systems Tor-M2DT 
(Russian-made short range missiles; NATO: SA-15 Gauntlet) was assigned to the Northern 
Fleet, which seems to be well beyond the amount needed based on the number of foreign 
troops in the region.195 
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d. Military Assertiveness 
Perhaps more worrying that the military buildup is what Russia is practicing (and 
signaling) through military exercises. Direct experience and adaptability of Russian Arctic 
forces have been demonstrated through numerous military exercises in the Arctic, covering 
a vast array of missions and focusing on the “overall combat readiness of the Northern 
Fleet, and also testing the battle capacities of the Arctic troops.”196 A recent study detailed 
a selected number of Russian military exercises that were conducted between 2014 and 
2017, highlighting all spectrum of missions (to include large-scale navigation exercises 
and strategic bombers’ air flight), the large number of servicemen, and the various number 
of weapons tested (from tactic to strategic levels, to include missile launches).197 
Moreover, exercises from the last two years such as the Vostok-2018, or Grom-
2019 were the biggest ever held by Russia, and involved Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, 
all of Russia’s naval fleets, and a very large number of troops and aircrafts; they also tested 
nuclear warheads along with other ballistic missiles.198 
The rise of military forces and resources committed to these activities could suggest 
the potential declining of other diplomatic means Russia could use in its stand in the Arctic, 
but not only. However, Western countries understand that the likelihood of “Russia’s direct 
military intervention in the Arctic is quite low because Russia’s main interest is preserving 
its sphere of influence [in region];”199 therefore they cannot be alarmed by Russia’s 
military accumulation. 
The concerns of a revisionist Russia employing a hard power strategy when it 
comes to the Arctic can be considered when we explore its military actions in the context 
of Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, where Russia safeguarded its national interest in its near 
abroad, thus negatively affecting its relations with the Western countries. Moreover, 
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according to James Sherr, Russia will continue to use kinetic and non-kinetic instruments 
to force material changes upon the Western countries if it believes that it has the capacity 
to do so.200  Consequently, that the nerves between the Western countries and Russia 
surfaces not from the existence of Russian national interests in the Arctic, but contrary 
from the activities Russia is pledge to rise and secure its interests.201 
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V. BREAKING THE DEADLOCK 
Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.202 
 
Russia’s prioritization of the Arctic and its bellicose behavior are the primary 
driving factors in making the Arctic a security concern. As an Arctic power, Russia is 
expected to project its military power in the region. However, due to Russia’s pattern of 
aggression and its self-assurance, its presence there should be viewed with some caution 
by the Western states. 
The United States is considered an Arctic state by way of its Alaskan coastline. 
Therefore, the United States is one of the few states with economic interests in the region 
which at the same time brings security issues to its foreign policy. However, the Arctic 
region has been neglected in the United States external policy, for almost 30 years, and 
nowadays the dearth of its attention borders on negligence.203  
The “gradual” point of bringing the Arctic to NATO’s attention is based on the 
slow steps that the United States and its allies undertake. These gradual measures can be 
seen as the United States and its allies shift their attention to the Arctic by developing 
policy about the region and increasing their assertiveness in the area. However, a 
miscalculated “sudden” move may bring security challenges. Given Russia is already 
concerned about a NATO Exclusive Zone. 
A. ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS: AN UNBALANCED STOOL? 
This chapter deals with the implications of the United States and NATO deterring 
Russia’s activity in the Arctic. Bringing the Arctic under NATO’s attention comes with 
certain challenges. In assessing these challenge, I will consider Arthur Lykke’s three-
legged stool model, depicted in Figure 8, where strategy is defined by the sum of its Ends 
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(the objectives), Ways (the concepts), and Means (the resources), and moreover, if these 
three concepts are not in balance, the strategy delivered comes with greater risk.204  
 
 Lykke Three-Legged Stool Strategy205 
1. The Arctic’s Plan of Action 
In Lykke’s model the Ends represent the desired end state; they explain what this 
strategy aims to achieve. In this study, the desired objective of the Arctic deadlock is the 
promotion of NATO and its close partners nearby (including, but not limited to Finland, 
and Sweden), with the United States, as a leading role. This would involve expanded 
cooperation among the four littoral states that are part of NATO, and the adoption of a 
proper deterrence strategy against Russia. 
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A similar approach should be initiated and enhanced through the Enhanced 
Opportunities Partners (EOP)206 program, in which Sweden and Finland are playing 
important roles, as being Arctic states outside the NATO.207 The trade-off of this 
partnership is that Russia may strengthen its military capabilities and partnership with other 
actors, such as China, hence only a step to a possible crisis in the Arctic. This brings into 
discussion the security dilemma; although that discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
it does raise questions for future research. Briefly, bringing the Arctic to NATO’s attention 
should be a strategic objective for the United States and its allies; therefore, the assessment 
for delivering such an option should be considered as “high.” 
2. Gradual Return into the Arctic by Bureaucratic Means and Persistent 
Nearness 
How this strategy will be accomplished lead to the second part of the three-legged 
stool, the Ways in which it will be accomplished, which should resolve the question of 
what this strategy will look like. As mentioned earlier, the United States has paid little 
attention to the problem of the Arctic since the end of the Cold War.  
The United States did not have an articulated policy on the Arctic until 2009, when 
Bush administration released the National Security Presidential Directive 66/ Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 25, “establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic 
region.”208 Since then, little has been done, apart from the release of several strategic 
documents, including “the May 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic region,” the “January 
2014 Implementation Plan for National Strategy for Arctic Region,” the “January 2015 
Executive Order for Enhancing Coordination of Arctic Efforts,” (all three of them released 
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by the Obama Administration), and the “December 2017 National Security Strategy 
Document” (though the term Arctic only mentioned once).209 
However, the United States Arctic Strategy, released in June 2019, outlines the 
“Department of Defense’s… strategy for the Arctic in an era of strategic competition.”210 
The new document supersedes previous documents related to the Arctic and focuses on the 
competition with China and Russia as being the principal challenges to long-term United 
States security and prosperity. The updated strategy’s “desired end-state for the Arctic is a 
secure and stable region where United States national security interests are safeguarded, 
the homeland of the United States is defended, and nations work in cooperation to address 
shared challenges.”211  
When it comes to NATO, the absence of interest is even greater. Though Secretary 
General Jens Stoltenberg, through various press statements, has recognized the increasing 
importance of the Arctic, the alliance lacks a specific policy for the region; the security 
challenges in the Arctic are missing from the current NATO Strategic Concept, which dates 
from 2010.212 Therefore, without a comprehensive NATO security concept for the Arctic 
based on defense, deterrence and cooperation, the region may bring challenges for the 
NATO alliance and its members. 
Actual evidence of the United States’ growing interest in the Arctic is seen through 
its raised assertiveness there, culminating in the series of Northern Edge joint-training 
exercises. Approximately 10,000 military personnel participated in the 2019 exercise, 
which was hosted by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The USS Theodore Roosevelt (a 
Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier) and its Carrier Strike Group also 
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participated, the first time in a decade that an aircraft carrier had sailed to Alaska.213  The 
exercise follows the NATO Exercise Trident Juncture 2018, when the USS Harry S. 
Truman and its Carrier Strike Group deployed in the cold Norwegian waters in the Arctic 
Circle, being a first since the ending of the Cold War. Moreover, Trident Juncture 2018 
brought together all of  NATO’s members countries (29 at that time), and also the Arctic 
states Finland and Sweden.214 Though the United States and its allies through NATO have 
stepped up their presence by military assertiveness and enhancing cooperation in the 
region, the stake is the Russian views and opposition to the incursion of  the alliance in the 
Arctic.215 
In comparison with the United States and its allies, Russia’s tempo of exercises and 
training is higher, and has “expanded significantly over the last twelve years.”216 As seen 
in the previous two chapters, the same thing can be argued about Russia’s military buildup. 
To sum up, the gradual approach to the Arctic taken by the United States and its allies, 
differs from Russia’s approach and seems to be “moderate.” 
3. Shattering the Ice 
The third leg of the strategy, the Means, addressed the type of resources that will 
be required to accomplish the desired objective for the Arctic.217 This section will briefly 
analyze the intangible (the will) or tangible (the icebreakers fleet - as being essential in 
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having Arctic superiority, the facilities, etc.) means that the United States and its allies 
dedicates to the Arctic region. 
The comparison of icebreaker fleets between countries with interests in the polar 
region and Russia, depicted in Figure 9, is essential in assessing the resources needed to 
achieve and maintain the preferred goal for the Arctic. Though icebreaker capability is not 
a substitute for a well-resourced and consistent United States Arctic policy, it does provide 
a primary factor to security and stability in the Arctic, as icebreakers provide the ability to 
supply and maneuver in the region, and are crucial in SAR operations. Also, when it comes 
to icebreaker capability, Russia is leading by far with an impressive 46 vessels. Moreover, 
with the commission of the Arktika in December 2019, Russia became the only country in 
the world to operate a nuclear-powered icebreaker.218 At the same time, Putin issued a 
statement declaring that the majority of Russia’s Arctic heavy-duty icebreakers would be 
powered by nuclear reactors.219 
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 Icebreakers of the World220 
As a whole, “the Arctic security concerns play only a minor role in overall United 
States defence policy.”221 However, in 2019, the United States began to view the Arctic 
in terms of Great Power Competition, acknowledging the strengthened military and 
economic presence of Russia. In a speech to the Arctic Council in Rovaniemi, Finland, in 
May 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo summarized this viewpoint: “This is America’s 
moment to stand up as an Arctic nation… The region has become an arena of global power 
and competition… We’re entering a new age of strategic engagement in the Arctic, 
complete with new threats to Arctic interests and its real estate.”222 
However, despite the military modernization and, in some cases expansion of all 
five Arctic rim states, their commitment towards the Arctic is limited and has advanced 
slowly; also, the official policies released by those states appear to be focused solely on the 
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defense of their current national territories.223  As was mention earlier, the same statement 
is true for the NATO alliance as a whole. 
a. Canada 
Canada’s policy to military issues in the Arctic has been a careful one, primarily 
dedicated to environmental security. However, climate change and the new geopolitical 
interest have raised broader security issues and a number of initiatives introduced since the 
late 2000s have been aimed at strengthening Canadian Arctic sovereignty.224 One of these 
measures is the extension of its Canadian Air Defense Identification Zone in 2018, to cover 
not only all of Canada’s landmass, but the entirety of its Arctic territory. It comes as a 
response to Russia stepping up its long bomber patrols, alongside the Arctic border of 
Canada and the United States.225 
Also, in addition to the current force power of its icebreaker fleet, (which belongs 
solely to the Canadian Coast Guard, seven vessels plus two under construction), the 
Canadian Government announced that it will be procuring six new icebreakers to replace 
its current old fleet (which on average is 42 years old) in order to ensure year-long 
icebreaking support and SAR operations.226 
In considering facilities, “the nearest Canadian naval base to the Arctic region is at 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, in the far southeast of Canada” with a small and old “coast guard 
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base at Nanisivik on Baffin Island, Nunavut.”227 The base at Nanisivik was due to be 
expanded at a cost of approximatively $100 million; however, the expansion was delayed 
and the base was downsize to just a refueling base.228 
b. Denmark/ Greenland 
Denmark’s stand on the Arctic matter is reflected in its latest Arctic policy from 
2016. In summary, although Denmark has recognized Russia’s increased military activity 
in the Arctic, it did not consider this a priority as it viewed Russia’s buildup to be “primarily 
defensive in nature.”229 However, according with the Danish prime minister, Denmark is 
now preparing to triple its defense spending in the Arctic to a total of $220 million for a 
three year period in order to enhance its surveillance capacity around Greenland, as well 
as to detect Russian submarines patrolling in the vicinity of the island.230 
As seen in Figure 9, Denmark has limited capabilities in the numbers of its 
icebreakers (four) with no known plans for rebuilding or modernizing its fleet. Moreover, 
the vessels it has have limited capabilities of breaking ice (thinner as much as 80 cm).231 
In Greenland, Nuuk and Thule are the main facilities focused on military issues. 
Nuuk serves as a command headquarters for the Danish military that is responsible for 
coordinating deployments across the Arctic and Antarctic. Thule Air Base in Greenland’s 
northwest houses a large intercontinental ballistic missile detection radar station but no 
                                                 
227 Wezeman, “Military Capabilities in the Arctic.” 
228 Wezeman. 
229 House of Commons, On Thin Ice. 
230 Kevin McGwin, “Denmark Will Triple Arctic Defense Spending,” ArcticToday (blog), December 
3, 2019, https://www.arctictoday.com/denmark-will-triple-arctic-defense-spending/. 
231 Edward H. Lundquist, “Danish Navy’s Knud Rasmussen-Class Patrol Ships Are Built for Icy 




aircraft; an agreement regarding its use by an alliance between Denmark, Canada, and the 
United States has recently been renewed.232  
c. Norway 
Norway is one of the few NATO country with a direct border with Russia, which 
is situated west of the Kola Peninsula, over the Arctic Circle. Maintaining stability and 
international cooperation in the Arctic region comes as one of the Norway’ strategic 
goal.233 Furthermore, due to the proximity of Russia, Norway stresses the importance of 
military security and NATO’s territorial defense guarantees. However, Norway position 
on Arctic matters in relation with Russia, has taken a dual approach: maintain bilateral 
cooperation while at the same time holding a policy of strong defense.234  
This approach is highlighted on several documents. First, the Soria Moria 
Declaration from 2007 prioritizes the Arctic region of Norway (the Svalbard archipelago) 
within its national defense, as well as identifying the region to be of strategic 
importance.235 It is also worth mentioning Norway’s White paper “Defining the Foreign 
Policy and Security Policy” from 2017. Designed for a period of eight years, this policy 
emphasizes the military and strategic importance of the Arctic, and moreover, turns Russia 
from a partner to a threat.236 In April 2017, Norway also release its first Arctic Strategy 
focused on promoting “a peaceful, innovative and sustainable region,” where international 
cooperation under the norms of law is the overarching goal.237 
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Norway’s defense spending for the Arctic has also increased since 2015 by 25 
percent in real terms, with plans for acquisition of new F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, maritime 
patrol aircraft, conventional submarines, modern air defense systems and intelligence 
capabilities.238 However, it almost lacks icebreaking capabilities, as seen in Figure 9, with 
the exception of one icebreaker, operated by the Norwegian Coast Guard, and a new 
oceanographic icebreaker launched in 2017, which is operated by civilian agencies for 
civilian purposes, in both oceanographic research and fishing.239  
Starting with 2009, Norway began the process of moving some of its military 
headquarters north, of the Arctic circle, including Norwegian Army HQ, Norwegian 
Armed Forces HQ, Coast Guard HQ, along with some aviation facilities.240 It is also worth 
noting that, out of all NATO members, Norway has one of the most active military in the 
Arctic; since 2006 is has been the lead country for large military exercises such as Cold 
Challenge and Arctic Challenge, and has played a major role in other NATO exercises such 
as the Trident Juncture Series.241   
d. United States 
As was mentioned previously, Arctic policies have played a minor role in the 
United States’ overall defense strategy. The strategic direction outlined in documents 
discussed in Section A.2. is to “describe U.S. national security and homeland security 
interests in the Arctic,” to commit “increased attention to the Arctic in their [DOD and the 
Coast Guard] planning and operation,” and “to strengthen international cooperation,” by 
ensuring the status quo of the region.242 Therefore, the United States and NATO can deter 
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and defense their territories from possible threats through their military advantages not only 
in the Arctic but also in other regions.243 To conclude, in the 2019 United States Arctic 
Strategy, concerns about the increased military presence, buildup and interest of Russia are 
highlighted as risks to United States national security goals in the region.244  
When it comes to the icebreaking capability, the United States capability, is 
seriously dwarfed by that of Russia, as is easily seen in Figure 9. The United States 
icebreaking fleet consists of just one heavy polar icebreaker and two medium polar 
icebreakers (one of which has been nonoperational since 2010 and is used for spare parts 
in keeping the other one operational), all of them with more than 30 years in service.245 
However, in 2013 the United States Coast Guard (USCG) initiated Polar Security Cutter, 
a program to acquire three new heavy polar icebreakers and three medium polar 
icebreakers, with an estimated cost of $2.619 billion for the first three heavy vessels, with 
the first projected to be delivered in 2024.246 
The majority of the United States Army military facilities, with the exception of 
Thule Air Base in Greenland, are located in Alaska. These include two large air bases, two 
land bases located in Anchorage and Fairbanks, and other small facilities, most of them 
part of North American Aerospace Defense Command, an integrated United States and 
Canadian air and missile defense system.247 The United States army does not have 
permanent sea facilities dedicated to the Arctic region, and the Coast Guard’s icebreakers 
are homeported in Seattle, which is approximately 11 days sailing away from the closest 
                                                 
243 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, 13. 
244 Department of Defense, 6. 
245 O’Rourke, Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and 
Issues for Congress, 3–4. 
246 O’Rourke, 5–6. 
247 Wezeman, “Military Capabilities in the Arctic.” 
69 
United States Arctic harbor.248 However, the activation of the United States 2nd  Fleet in 
2018, to operate both in the North Atlantic and the Arctic, comes as a recognition of the 
challenging and complex security environment that the changes in the Arctic region (ice 
melting and the resurgence of Russia) have brought.249 Moreover, in 2019, the United 
States Congress called for a bill to identify and designate a strategic port in the Arctic as a 
measure to counter Russia’s advances in the region.250  
Evidence of the United States’ growing interest in the Arctic is seen also by its 
increase military assertiveness, evident in Exercise Northern Edge and the NATO Exercise 
Trident Juncture 2018. Its Arctic operations capabilities are also sustained through 
numerous recurring exercises, including the Alaska Shield summer exercises and Ice 
Exercise series, the last one with a tradition dating back to the early Cold War.251   
To sum up, the United States Armed Forces (to include the United States 
intelligence agencies), particularly the Navy and the Coast Guard are “paying renewed 
attention” to the Arctic.252 The challenges in the Arctic need an approach with a strong 
commitment to multilateral cooperation, and the United States with its allies should take 
more seriously the rising challenges and opportunities, and adopt a more assertive 
deterrence strategy. 
e. Iceland, Finland, and Sweden 
The three countries: Iceland, Finland and Sweden are considered Arctic states since 
part of their territory are above the Arctic circle. However, they lack direct access to the 
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Arctic Ocean. Furthermore, they are part of the Arctic Council, an organization founded in 
1996 that deals with issues regarding environmental and sustainable environment, as well 
as promoting cooperation among the eight Arctic states, but exclusively set asides military 
issues.253 
Even though Iceland officially has no regular army, its geographic location gives 
the small country a great strategic role, especially to the United States. It was crucially 
important throughout the Cold War, since the United States operated a major Naval Air 
base, in Keflavik, Iceland, until 2006.254 However, the Icelandic Coast Guard and Crisis 
Response Unit are considered fully military in all but name.255 With limited assets, the 
Icelandic Coast Guard is responsible for the coordination of all SAR operation within its 
economic zone. Iceland’s view about its security is that “certain developments in the 
Russian military might be a concern… in the future,” but it hopes for peaceful cooperation 
and no militarization in the region.256  
The increasing needs for mutual defense bring the country further into NATO and 
closer to the United States, with the initiative of Icelandic Air Policing by NATO in 2008, 
which provides Iceland with an air defense capability in the absence of its own, but also 
with the reactivation of the United States Naval Base in Keflavik in 2016.257 Moreover, 
Iceland is part of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), which consists of 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, a structure of cooperation that works to 
strengthen the member states’ national defenses.258 
Although Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, they play an important 
role in the alliance, being two of NATO’s partners with status as EOPs. The new Sweden 
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Arctic policy from 2020, which supersedes the country’s strategy from 2011, is mainly 
focused on the people, peace, and climate, and states that “the current security policy 
challenges in the Arctic are not of a military nature.”259 Moreover, Sweden looks to ensure 
that the Arctic remains a region where security issues are at a low level. Finland also has 
the same political approach in its Arctic Strategy revision from 2013, and is working one 
at its new Arctic Strategy, which will focused on economic development “within the 
carrying capacity of the environment” and putting the climate first.260 
Both countries recognize the military buildup of Russia in the Arctic, but their 
concerns are more focused on the Baltic Sea region. When asked about Arctic being 
militarized the Swedish ambassador to the United Kingdom, stated that “Russia focus on 
building up…, because is that they do all over their territory.”261 Finland’s  foreign and 
defense policy has a similar focus, stating that “Russia has also increased its military 
footprint and activity in the Arctic, where the situation, so far, has remained relatively 
stable.”262   
When it comes to icebreaker capabilities, both countries have a large fleet of 
icebreakers, as depicted in Figure 9. However, their armadas have different roles. Sweden 
dedicates four of its medium polar icebreakers to Arctic operations (SAR and oil spill 
recovery), while Finland has assigned seven out of its fleet of 10 medium polar icebreakers 
to the region’s challenges, with the remaining ones being dedicated to the Baltic region.263 
All three countries have tested their training and interoperability with NATO 
through different exercises meant to defend Northern Europe and the Arctic. Not only did 
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they contribute substantial number of troops to these exercises, they were also involved in 
planning for the Trident Juncture 18 exercise.264 Moreover, Finland and Sweden have 
managed to create, maintain and strengthen closer security relationships with their allies in 
NATO , more than any other Alliance partner, because the two countries share not only an 
unofficial agreement in not seeking NATO membership, but also “have a mutual interest 
to cooperate on the defense of the Baltic,” where their interest align.265 
Based on the information presented in this section, it is apparent that the overall 
situational awareness of the Arctic, whether regarding tangible resources or intangible 
strategies, is relatively constant among all the Western Arctic states. Most of the countries 
have adapted their official national documents regarding the Arctic to the new security and 
environmental challenges, taking small steps from the focus on the defense of their national 
territory in the Arctic to engage in expanded cooperation. Besides that, most of the Arctic 
countries have started to increase their spending in acquisition and modernization of their 
Arctic forces. However, they are far from reaching the number of icebreakers in Russia’s 
fleet, and in sum, the fleet of the Western Arctic states is comparable to about half that of 
Russia. Therefore, after examining the resources needed for an Arctic strategy among the 
Western Arctic States, I assess them as being low to moderate in supporting their desired 
end goal. 
4. The Risk  
The last premise of the three-legged stool strategy applied to this study is that some 
risk is inherent and needs to be considered in assessing a comprehensive Arctic strategy. 
The balance, between what is desired to be achieved, in this case a stable and peaceful 
Arctic, and the concepts and resources available to achieve this objective demands to be 
stable.266 Therefore, the risk related to delivering this strategy needs to considered in this 
research. 
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The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the Arctic is likely to be one of 
the twenty-first century’s most contested places. Accurate assessment is necessary to the 
formulation of an Arctic strategy. The United States’ and NATOs relations with Russia 
have been deteriorating for years, especially after Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014.  
Therefore, one of the risks is that Russia will perceive that fear in terms of 
perceptions that the other Arctic states, especially the other four rim-states, have decided 
to cooperate and pull together a strategy against it. Russia’s fear of this makes sense and is 
legitimate, and Russia may have felt that it deserved to develop its military capabilities in 
the Arctic. On the other hand, Russia may view the United States and NATO’s 
militarization of their Arctic forces as offensive in nature. Therefore, a security dilemma 
may be unfolding in the Arctic. As noted by John Mearsheimer, “This is Geopolitics 101: 
great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near home territory.”267 Russia is a 
great power, and as seen in the past in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, has always 
responded to American and NATO attempts to expand their influence near its borders.  
However, the crises from Georgia and Ukraine are similar example of competition 
over influence between Russia and the West, where Russia took military actions because 
it lacked the attractiveness of the West.268 The situation is different in the Arctic, due to 
the fact that the region is governed differently; moreover, besides the Arctic states 
domestically objectives, they share common interests in keeping a stable and peaceful 
Arctic. 
The same perception of the risk occurs with the close cooperation that NATO has 
with Finland and Sweden. Even though neither country is a member of NATO and neither 
is seeking that membership, Russia recognizes that they will stand close with NATO in 
case of a crisis. Furthermore, a formal NATO membership of those two countries would 
                                                 




increase Russian concerns about balance of power not only in the Arctic, but also in the 
Baltic Sea region.269 
Another risk that needs to be considered comes from the solution to the desired 
objective. Is NATO willing to engage into the Arctic? As was discussed earlier in this 
chapter, although NATO members among the Arctic states have a common interesting in 
keeping the Arctic environment free and stable, some of them hold different views 
regarding security in the region. Overlapping disputes between the NATO Arctic states 
regarding economic interests, particularly over the delimitation of their respective EEZ, 
may also cause disagreements; this is the case for all four NATO Arctic states, to include 
Iceland as well, which have been involved so far in six disputes concerning Arctic EEZ, 
one over the legal status of straits, and one over the delimitation of the continental shelf.270 
There are also concerns about some countries disagreeing with NATO’s 
militarization of the Arctic. This is the case of Iceland, as its Prime Minister has expressed 
his opinion that her country should leave NATO over concerns about a possible Arctic 
policy being too militaristic.271 The same issues related to the militarization of the Arctic 
have been expressed by some scholars from Canada, who claim that the expansion of 
NATO in the region could deteriorate Canadian and Russian cooperation in areas such as 
SAR operation.272  
On the other hand, non-Arctic NATO countries, such as the United Kingdom, are 
encouraging the expansion of the alliance into the Arctic, which together with the North 
Atlantic is of strategic importance for the United Kingdom and Europe security. The 
concern is significant, especially nowadays with Russia’s military resurgence, and with the 
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renew importance of the GIUK gap (see Figure 3), a maritime choke point between the 
Arctic and North Atlantic that is back in the calculations of military strategic thinkers, 
especially those of Russia.273   
Finally, global climate change, along with natural disasters, and marine perils such 
as  oil spills or sea damage, are also need to be considered in assessing the risk, as the 
melting of the Arctic ice is a driving factor in the polar environment and, to the same extent, 
of geopolitical issues. All of the above have been recognized as risks in the Arctic region, 
and in 2011, all Arctic states, to include Russia, signed the Arctic agreement - Arctic 
Council Agreement on Arctic SAR -  on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime SAR in 
the region.274 Moreover, in 2015, this cooperation was strengthen when a new agreement 
between the all Arctic states was signed, committing their coast guards to cooperate and 
coordinate SAR operations under the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF).275  
Even though joint military actions in the Arctic were suspended after Russia 
annexed Crimea in 2014, cooperation on SAR operations has continued, to include real 
crisis requests (in 2014, Russia called the USCG for help with a South Korean trawler that 
sank on the Russian side of Bering Sea), or joint exercises under the Arctic SAR 
Agreement.276 At the same time, Russia’s inability to resolve the South Korean trawler 
incident in a timely manner, raises the question of Russian SAR capabilities. 
Even though there is an unbalanced equilibrium of the Ways, Ends, and Means 
which has led to considerable risk in bringing the Arctic to the United States’ and NATO’s 
attention, the research reported here finds that the new security environment, along with 
the economic prospective brought by the global climate change in the region, requires that 
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the United States, as a leading voice, should take a stand, and deliver a deterrence strategy 
based on expanded cooperation between the four littoral states that are also NATO 
members. Furthermore, this approach can start in places where this cooperation has already 




Only when the ice breaks will you truly know who your friend is and who 
is your enemy.277  
—Inuit proverb 
 
Buying land in the Arctic is not a solution for the United States. Engaging others 
might be the solution for a strategy of defense and deterrence in the Arctic. This study 
focused on Russia’s increased military and economic endeavor in the Arctic and brings 
into attention the ability of Arctic states to deter Russia’s expansion and protect their 
interests through legal and peaceful means.  
This thesis started by asking the question, “Which is the strategy that the United 
States and its allies should establish to defense and deter against Russian influence in the 
Arctic? “ It started by examining Russia’s economic interests in the Arctic, its security 
concerns related to the region’s strategic importance for Russian policies, and its desire for 
international acknowledgement, which is tied to its national pride. This thesis then looked 
at Russia’s activities, seeking to find out how and under what circumstances Russia is likely 
to engage in confrontation to protect its national interests in the Arctic region and reaffirm 
to its domestic audience its position as a great power in the international arena. The last 
part pointed out the compromise of bringing the Arctic to NATO’s attention as a way ahead 
strategy, by focusing on the gradual measures that the United States and its allies have 
undertaken, first by acknowledging the importance of the Arctic, and then by dedicating 
resources for mastering it. 
In examining Russia’s interests in the Arctic, these findings show that Moscow’s 
dedicated policies towards the Arctic emphasize the importance that the High North holds 
for Russia. Investing in the Arctic has become a domestic, economic, and political priority 
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for Russia, as it considers itself the natural leader and main stakeholder in the region. This 
view is sustained by academics such as Laruelle, who wrote that “the Arctic has 
transformed into a flagship for Russia’s new nationhood…, crystallized as a Kremlin 
strategy during the second half of the 2000s.”278 In trying to achieve its economic 
ambitions, Russia needed to prioritize safeguarding and expanding its AZRF by military 
means as well as by pursuing “legal affairs” in the Arctic. It is estimated that Arctic oil 
production will account for 26 percent of Russia’s overall output by 2035, up from 11.8 
percent in 2007.279 Along with other economic prospects from the region, such as 
nonferrous and precious minerals, this demonstrates why the Arctic remains “a strategic 
development priority for the Russian government, despite high costs, Western sanctions 
and logistical issues.”280 Likewise, with regards at the NSR, Russia has tightened the 
screws on the maritime sea route, by enforcing its own laws on vessels passing through it. 
This has become a concern for other states, particularly the United States, for whom 
FONOPS is an important part of its naval strategy.281 
Russia’s activities in the Arctic, however, are part of its campaign regarding 
security challenges, and, as Klimenko noted, they provide Russia “strategic balance in 
relation to the United States and NATO.”282 On the other hand, regional initiatives such 
as NORDFECO, along with renewed attention to the Arctic region by the United States 
and others, as was discussed in Chapter 5, have come now that the Western Arctic states 
have seen the threats that revisionist Russia has posed in the region.283 
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Looking at the Western Arctic states’ interests and dedication in the region, and the 
proposed solution of bringing the Arctic to NATO’s attention, evidence suggests that 
despite the limitations and risks in doing so, the alliance’s strengths can be used to increase 
security in the region. In the end, the United States may consider delivering a 
comprehensive Arctic strategy through NATO that is focused on deterrence and the 
defense of its members.  
However, the new DOD Arctic Strategy identifies three risks that have emerged for 
the United States’ renewed national interests in the Arctic. First, in the Arctic, Russia is in 
the position of being closer to the United States border, so the Arctic could offer the 
possibility of a direct attack on the United States homeland by Russia.284 Natural disasters 
and accidents are also taken into account, such as oil spills, thawing permafrost, or coastal 
erosion, which may inhibit the United States military response to project forces from its 
homeland. Second, Russia is “challenging the rules-based [international] order,” which 
also applies in the Arctic, by reportedly threatening “to use force against vessels that fail 
to abide by Russian regulations.”285  Russia also can use its military’s ability to deny 
access to disputed and self-proclaimed Arctic waters and resources. Finally, the Strategy 
recognizes that the Arctic is susceptible “to strategic spillover from tensions, competition, 
or conflict arising in these other regions” of the world.286  
Together with the risks identified in the previous chapter, and due the fact that 
NATO does not have control over the internal policies of its member states, an uncertainty 
in addressing the Arctic security has emerged. The NATO alliance cannot totally satisfy 
its Arctic members’ interests in the region, and therefore does not appear to hold the answer 
to the Arctic “deadlock.” Furthermore, NATO includes countries without any interest in 
the Arctic region. Therefore, such a measure could probably destabilize the alliance and 
discourage it from becoming more involved in Arctic security issues, particularly if Article 
5 is brought into the discussion.  
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However, the Arctic has been dismissed far too long by the Western states and 
institutions. With all of the challenges mentioned above, NATO needs to balance between 
dedicating excessive attention to the region and neglecting to address security issues related 
to the Arctic, since is the only institution fit to deal with the military issues of the region. 
A new organization should be excluded from the discussion, as the Arctic is often perceived 
by the media and public opinion as “a new Wild West,” but extended cooperation outside 
of NATO should be considered as it is the case of Finland and Sweden.287   
A. WAY AHEAD 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, and identified as one of the risks, some countries, such 
as the United Kingdom have encouraged bringing the Arctic to NATO’s attention, others 
such as Canada and Iceland discourage that.288 A security dilemma, may unfold in this 
matter, as NATO expands and increases its influence in parallel with Russia’s increased 
national interest in the Arctic. On the same note, according to Klimenko, Russia’s focus 
after 2014 has been changed towards other regions such as the Black Sea (Crimea) or the 
Barents Sea, leaving the Arctic on the side.289 
The findings in this study suggest that a clear path for the Arctic is not easy to be 
seen. As a matter of fact, the increasing number of exercises by NATO and its allies on the 
one side, and Russia on the other might be a sign of distrust and preparation for an 
adversarial approach in the Arctic issue.  
1. NATO as a Course of Action 
Russia has expressed its opposition to the possible presence of NATO in the Arctic. 
In a speech to the Barents Summit in Norway, June 2013, Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry 
Medvedev made this point expressing Russia’s view: “Today independent experts are 
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concerned that NATO may use emergency and disaster preparedness measures to cover its 
indirect attempts to militarize the Arctic.”290 Furthermore, as Sergunin and Konyshev 
pointed out when summarizing the December 2014 Russian military doctrine signed by 
Putin, “NATO’s military buildup in the Arctic,” and Russia’s neighbors in the region are 
considered “the main external dangers to Russia’s security.”291 This views remain relevant 
nowadays, when Russia view its NATO neighbors in the Arctic as “direct threats to our 
[Russia’s] national security,” as Medvedev stated at the Russian Security Council in 
October 2020 when the new Russian Arctic Commission was established.292  
However, solutions can be provided, as Russia has shown in the past, when it was 
willing to engage in dialogue with the United States and NATO. After the Cold War, Russia 
joined the North Atlantic Council (1991), and relations were strengthened in 2002 with the 
establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), where security issues and cooperation 
in areas of common interests, such as the Arctic, were addressed.293 Even so, these 
dialogues were suspended after Russia’s illegal intervention in Ukraine in 2014 and the 
Western states’ imposition of sanctions on Russia.294  
2. Search and Rescue 
Even though this cannot be taken for granted, a cooperative pattern has been noticed 
in institutions such as the Arctic Council or the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, where Russia 
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“is a determined actor.”295 Furthermore, as was mentioned in Chapter 5,  Russia has always 
cooperated in joint SAR operations, since the signing of the 2011 Arctic agreement on 
Arctic SAR and culminating with the establishment of the ACGF.296  
Training and cooperation through joint exercises took place regularly, including the 
last Norway–Russia Exercise Barents 2018 as part of its annual series;297 the 2019 
Finland–Norway–Sweden–Russia Barents Rescue Exercise part of its series;298 and joint 
exercises such as the Arctic Chinook, led by Canada under the Arctic agreement on Arctic 
SAR.299 This behavior is a positive sign of Russia’s favoring regional cooperation, 
especially in areas such as emergency situations, maritime safety and SAR. Therefore, 
steps towards this cooperation should be taken into account in the approach of the Western 
states towards the Arctic and Russia.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
Even though Russia’s current militarization does not necessarily suggest 
preparedness for offensive actions in the Arctic, accidental escalations due to climate 
change, maritime or economic rights may occur, and tensions elsewhere in the world 
between Russia and the United States in particular may spill over into the Arctic region.300 
A new approach to looking at Article 5 in the context of the Arctic should be assessed, 
along with the willingness of NATO members that are not Arctic states to dedicate 
resources and planning towards the region. A leading role in this matter should came from 
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the United States as it is a rival of Russia and has already recognized the Great Power 
Competition emerging in the Arctic region.301 
Even with the risks already noticed, a NATO Arctic Strategy should be delivered, 
or at least discussed, to ensure that there is a common understanding of the region’s security 
challenges. The NRC could be a good start, as Russia can be invited to address its concerns, 
and furthermore, it will promote transparency about NATO’s intentions. On the same note, 
NATO should strengthen training, partnership, and operations in the Arctic, not only within 
its Arctic member states, but also with its close partners like Finland and Sweden or NATO 
members that are not Arctic states.  
Promoting and developing scientific cooperation should be encouraged. Despite 
ongoing competition, on this matter, Russia has openly shared its discoveries, with the 
United Nations CLCS, and with countries such as Canada and Denmark.302 This 
cooperation-enhanced dialogue between the Arctic countries, has eased the clarification of 
overlapping disputes in the Arctic and can improve the understanding of the Arctic Ocean 
and its prospects.  
Security wise, the United States and NATO should review the possible places in 
the region susceptible to infringements, such as the GIUK gap, the Svalbard Archipelago, 
the area near the Kola Peninsula, the NSR or even the disputed North Pole. The evidence 
suggests that the areas just mentioned are in the calculations of Russia’s thinkers. Security 
policies to address them need to be considered by all Arctic states and not only them: for 
example, the GIUK gap, is of strategic importance for the United Kingdom.  
As a final thought, to ensure stability and security in the region, a comprehensive 
and coherent approach should be considered by all Arctic states. A strategy in this matter 
should not be excluded from the Western calculation to deter Russia’s presence in the 
Arctic and, in some cases, foreign intrusion. This policy needs to deliver enduring security 
in response to military competition. It also needs to be backed by the military strength and 
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will of NATO. It should take into account the actual status quo in the region, the 
commitment of the alliance’s members, the international community views on the Arctic, 
and last but not least, global climate change which has brought new geopolitical challenges. 
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